基于不可信证据源与冲突重分配的证据合成方法

针对D-S证据理论在高冲突下失效的问题,在比较修正原始证据源和重新分配冲突两种方法的基础上,提出一种新的合成规则,新方法用可信度修正证据的同时,把全局冲突分为两部分,并依据"全局冲突在全局分配、局部冲突在局部分配"的原则对冲突进行细化分配。通过仿真分析,并与其他方法比较,新的合成方法能更好地融合冲突证据,收敛速度快,具有较强的抗干扰能力。     

军事云环境下基于动态博弈的资源调度方法

针对军事云环境下联合指挥资源调度优化问题,综合考虑了多部队任务需求,多目标优化,多部队资源竞争等约束条件,运用动态博弈理论及方法,建立并提出了一种基于完全信息扩展博弈的资源调度模型及方法,提高了资源调度效率,兼顾了多部队利益,增加了联合作战效益。最后通过实验验证了其有效性及准确性。     

基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

舰载反潜直升机吊放声纳区域反潜策略建模

为提高舰载反潜直升机吊放声纳区域反潜搜索作战效能,对舰载反潜直升机吊放声纳区域反潜搜索策略问题进行了建模。根据潜艇目标位置信息的不确定性,研究了潜艇目标位置信息的概率分布函数,采用Markov状态转移概率矩阵描述了潜艇目标位置信息变化的方法。其次,给出了基于贝叶斯理论的潜艇目标信息概率分布函数更新公式。再次,推导了舰载反潜直升机吊放声纳区域反潜最优策略,给出了舰载直升机吊放声纳区域反潜搜索算法。最后给出了典型案例,验证了反潜搜索策略的有效性。研究成果可为舰载反潜直升机吊放声纳区域反潜提供决策依据。     

中国空间安全形势

随着中国在太空领域的不断崛起,太空地位不断提升的同时,也面临着各种各样的挑战,这些挑战既有源自传统政治领域的大国阻挠,也有来自外太空的人类共同威胁。为了应对这些威胁和挑战,保护中国的太空利益和国家利益,我们需要从多方面着手,多管齐下,以维护日益重要的中国国家太空利益。     

谈谈政治理论课的基地教学

当前,军队院校的政治理论课教学,以教员课堂讲授为主,重课堂理论教学、轻社会实践锻炼的现象比较严重。这种传统的教学模式不利于创新型人才培养和教育转型的需要。政治理论课必须向基地教学延伸。     

Turkey-Africa alliance: Evolving patterns in security relations

ABSTRACT

Turkey has maintained its strategic relations with Africa at the highest level under recent AK Party governments in the field not only of low politics but also of high politics. For example, it opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 and signed military, defense and security pacts with more than 25 African countries. This article traces the deep historical and cultural relations with Africa behind its newly evolving foreign policy identity, arguing that its booming economic power has been a significant driving force in shaping a new security strategy. It examines what the growing security involvement means for both Turkey and Africa in order to contribute to the relevant literature through a holistic approach from both theoretical and conceptual perspectives.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013