基于NSGA-II和多属性决策的防空火力分配

为了解决防空火力分配问题,首先运用NSGA-II算法求出Pareto最优解集,然后运用多属性决策方法对Pareto最优解集中的解进行综合评估,并从中找出一个最优解。用区间数定性描述各属性,建立了防空火力分配的三目标优化模型。描述了NSGA-II算法和多属性决策方法的运算步骤。在仿真算例中,得到了一个最佳防空火力分配方案,说明该方法对于防空火力分配问题有良好的应用价值。     

基于单亲遗传算法的战时维修力量抽调模型研究

分析了影响维修力量抽调决策的因素,对装备维修力量的抽调问题进行了数学描述,建立了一种基于灰色关联度的多目标优化模型。针对装备维修力量抽调的非线性多目标优化问题,提出了基于单亲遗传算法的求解方法,该算法用换位算子取代了传统的交叉、变异算子,但仍然保持了他们的进化功能。通过仿真算例分析表明,该方法可有效求解多目标的保障力量抽调问题。     

带运力限制及单边时变约束下多出发机场航空战略投送兵力分配模型研究

利用民航力量由多个机场向一个目标机场实施航空战略投送时,由于各民航机场都具有运力限制约束,不可能无限制地快速投送兵力,因此,考虑了在多个出发机场存在运力限制约束的情况下,构建了"投送时间最短,动员机场最少"多目标决策模型,并给出了优化算法和算例.     

空军网络化指挥信息系统作战效能评估指标体系构建

针对目前网络化指挥信息系统作战效能评估指标体系不完善、且缺乏分项指标计算方法模型等问题,从网络化作战对指挥信息系统的作战需求出发,研究构建了空军网络化指挥信息系统的作战效能评估指标体系,并提出了分项指标概念内涵和计算模型与方法,可为指挥信息系统研制提供参考和支撑,为其作战效能的客观评估提供指标体系和模型方法。     

基于作战能力图的兵力部署评估仿真

运用电子地图的发展成果和技术,通过将联合作战兵力转化为具有一定属性值的作战能力像素点,以点阵图形式来显示和研究兵力部署,实现对联合作战兵力部署的评估,为定量化研究联合作战兵力运用提供一种辅助决策的新方法.     

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.     

General Dostum and the Mazar i Sharif Campaign: new light on the role of Northern Alliance warlords in Operation Enduring Freedom

This report sheds new light on the CIA and US Special Forces' covert campaign alongside Afghan Northern Alliance leader General Dostum's horse-mounted Uzbeks during 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003 and 2005 the author traveled over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the plains of Northern Afghanistan and lived with the legendary Northern Alliance opposition leader General Dostum. His aim was to recreate Dostum's campaign alongside the CIA and Special Forces to seize the holy city of Mazar i Sharif from the Taliban in November 2001. Based on interviews with Dostum and his Uzbek commanders, this article recreates this proxy offensive that saw the Northern Alliance opposition break out of the mountains, seize this shrine town and bring the Taliban house of cards falling down in a matter of weeks. Up until now the indigenous Afghan Uzbeks, who played a crucial role as a ‘boots on the ground’ fighting force for Centcom, have been cast as a mere backdrop for American heroics. Now their side of the story and their links to the mysterious shrine of Mazar i Sharif are for the first time revealed.     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

‘Troops were then forced to fire’: British army crowd control in Palestine,November 1945

In November 1945, British army shooting during street riots and search operations in Palestine resulted in the death of 13 Jews and the injuring of dozens. The most costly in casualties caused by army fire during the whole Jewish insurgency, these incidents have nevertheless not received detailed attention in literature on the British army's counterinsurgency campaign in postwar Palestine. This article outlines British military use of firepower to control civilian crowds and the difficulties involved during these incidents, contributing to the debate on the army's principal of ‘minimum force’. It also highlights the serious problem of legitimizing opening of fire on unarmed protestors, epitomized in the army's fabricated account justifying shooting at a large crowd rushing a military cordon at Givat Hayim.