网络中心战中舰艇编队的作战效能分析

在网络中心战条件下,舰艇编队通过互通、互联和互操作,可在编队范围内共享资源,进行跨平台的通道组织和实现武器共用,这种跨平台的资源共享充分发挥了作战资源的利用率,增强了编队作战系统的生命力。建立了在网络中心战条件下的舰艇编队作战效能计算数模,并进行了分析和计算,解释了在网络支持下编队作战效能提升的原理,分析和计算方法可用于网络兵力的兵力指数计算和作战效能评估。     

子母弹抛撒半径对机场毁伤效果影响分析

首先阐述了机场目标在未来战争中的地位与作用 ,在对机场目标及其子目标分析的基础上 ,建立了炮道失效率的计算模型。利用蒙卡模拟的方法重点研究了子母弹抛撒半径对机场毁伤效果的影响 ,并摸索了一些规律     

飞机武器系统作战效能分析研究的进展

阐述了飞机武器系统的组成、作战任务、作战效能分析等发展概况。在此基础上就飞机武器系统作战效能分析研究进行了综述 ,并指出了飞机武器系统作战效能分析的发展趋势     

圆周合成孔径雷达的快速时域成像算法

为实现圆周合成孔径雷达(Circular Synthetic Aperture Radar,CSAR)快速成像,提出一种用于CSAR的快速时域成像算法。该算法通过将CSAR的圆孔径分成若干子孔径,分别对子孔径采用快速因式分解后向投影算法处理,再将各子图像相干插值叠加至同一坐标系下得到成像结果。详细分析算法实现中的坐标转换、误差控制和运算效率等关键问题,并用点目标仿真和实测数据处理结果验证算法的有效性。所研究方法具有成像范围大、计算量小等优点。     

A nation-in-the-making,in arms: control of force,strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions

At the core of waging war and strategy is the creation, control and use of force. This article investigates the volunteer battalions that mobilized in Ukraine during the spring of 2014. It contextualizes the volunteer phenomenon and focuses on the state strategies to establish control over these militias. As ambiguous entities arising from a situation characterized by rapid social change – revolution and war – the volunteer battalions threatened existing hierarchies and questioned state authority. The situation was exacerbated by the war, which deviated from the expectations of Ukrainian combatants and Western military observers alike. The state nevertheless enjoyed a modicum of success in reining in the militias through four strategies of undermining, co-option, incorporation and coercion. While predominantly integrated into a more rigid category of paramilitary forces, the volunteers continue to play a role in both the Ukrainian society and security sector to the unforeseeable future.     

The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies

ABSTRACT

The United States has provided substantial amounts of military assistance and aid since the end of World War Two. During the Cold War, it proved vital in protecting numerous regimes from communist takeovers. Successful outcomes occurred when American leaders made large initial aid commitments, and the states had the capacity and political willpower to use it effectively. However, Vietnam was an example of how U.S. support lagged, as leaders in Saigon preferred political survival instead of creating regime legitimacy. Following 9/11, American security aid focused on making weak countries develop stronger security forces. Unfortunately, this created Fabergé egg militaries: expensive and easily broken by insurgents. This article suggests long-term strategic commitments need to be made alongside more resources for the American State Department and similar organizations to focus on the politics of state-building. Finally, this article suggests strategies, such as “whole-of-government” approaches, to improve long-term security and political institution building.     

柔性背腔鼓型消声器声学特性分析

现有的鼓型消声器由具有刚性背腔的膨胀腔和张紧的薄膜构成,利用薄膜的振动辐射声场与原声场叠加作用,使得透射过消声器的声能减少,达到消声的目的。为使消声器兼具隔振作用,提出了新型柔性背腔鼓型消声器,基于Fourier-Galerkin方法建立其声学理论模型,将传递损失特性与现有的刚性背腔模型进行比较,进一步研究柔性背腔鼓形消声器的消声机理,并分析了背腔参数对性能的影响。计算结果表明,柔性背腔有效提高了消声器低频消声效果,较相同结构尺寸条件下的刚性背腔消声器,显著拓宽了有效消声带宽。     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

Revisiting the justification for an all-volunteer force

In 1968, President Nixon established the Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, or the Gates Commission, which served as the impetus and justification for an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). At the end of its deliberations, the commission recommended abolishing the draft and transforming the U.S. military into a force of volunteers beginning in 1973. Interestingly, the debate regarding the merits of both systems appeared to be largely economic – with cost–benefit analysis playing the primary role. Lately, we are beginning to see a new, politically-motivated impetus for returning to a “system of national service.” The ideas spurring this debate are many: the need to reaffirm the nation state, the commitment of citizens to the state, political ownership and oversight of the forces, the need for social equity in serving the nation, limiting the support for armed conflict by burden-sharing among citizens, and equitably spreading the personal cost of war.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.