鱼雷武器系统作战效能的多指标综合评估模型

从现代海战的特点和要求出发,基于系统性和时效性原则,构建了以固有作战能力、可靠性与维修性、保障性和作战适应能力为主要指标的鱼雷武器系统作战效能评估指标体系,提出了鱼雷作战时效性、控制目标能力、抗拦截能力等新的基本指标,建立了鱼雷武器系统作战效能的多指标综合评价模型.相对于ADC等模型,该模型可以对鱼雷武器系统作战效能进行更为科学、全面的评估.     

基于ANSYS的油罐拱顶稳定性分析

针对加肋拱顶稳定性十分复杂的问题,基于ANSYS建立了加肋拱顶油罐的三维有限元模型,对加肋拱顶的结构稳定性进行了数值模拟。对加肋拱顶在外压作用下的线性与非线性临界屈曲载荷进行了对比分析,利用弧长法获得了拱顶在加肋情况下径向、环向、轴向的载荷-位移曲线。结果表明:数值模拟的加肋拱顶屈曲方向和屈曲区域与实际失稳结果相一致,可以为加肋拱顶设计和稳定性分析提供一定参考。     

军队抢险救灾物资消耗模型的建立

军队抢险救灾物资消耗的确定,一直是困扰着各级部队的难题,也是影响部队战斗力再生的重要因素。军队抢险救灾物资消耗的确定可采用确定资金和确定实物来完成。通过建立数学模型对物资消耗进行计算,利用实例分析验证物资消耗模型。通过物资消耗模型解决了以往物资消耗确定的难题,减少了部队抢险救灾的隐形消耗。     

试论军队院校师生互动的理想模式——一种权威与民主并存的模式

由于军队的纪律性与服从性,使得军队的院校教育模式多了一层神秘感。在军队院校中,师生之间如何互动,才能达到理想的教学效果,成了近年来研究的热点。军队院校中,教师的权威固然不可缺少,但是民主的氛围同样可以遍及课堂。权威与民主,两者并非对立。权威与民主并存,应该成为现今军队院校教育中师生互动的理想模式。     

论消防工作与政府投入的数学原理

近年来,政府对消防投入水平较低。通过建立数学模型,从消防部门与政府的相互关系进行理论论证,抛砖引玉,提出消防工作的建议。     

舰船可靠性对维修费用的影响分析

对两类主要影响因素分别建立了相应的数学模型．依据约化理论,建立了维修费用的ＶＡＲ模型．同时,根据统计资料分析了实际舰载主要设备的故障规律,指出了传统定时维修方式的理论基础的不完整性．     

基于最大熵谱估计验证战术导弹的气动模型

现代谱估计方法是验证系统仿真模型的有效方法。战术导弹飞行试验的遥、外测数据记录了大量的过程参数,可以利用这些参数进行气动力和气动力矩的计算,与飞行试验过程参数进行分析比较。应用最大熵谱估计检验导弹的气动力和气动力矩模型的可信性,可以给出定量的结果。文章给出的方法可以作为战术导弹气动参数模型研究的一种辅助手段。     

紧固件拆装时间预计模型

紧固件拆装作业时间是影响机械产品维修性的主要因素之一,占机械产品维修作业时间的70％～80％。因此,探讨紧固件拆装作业时间的预计方法,对研究、设计机械产品的维修性,将是十分必要的。通过分析紧固件拆装作业过程,探索出了影响拆装作业时间的诸因素,并对所有的影响因素进行分析、权衡和回归,建立紧固件拆装作业时间的预计模型。将此模型在某型履带式车辆上进行了实际验证,证明了模型的正确性及通用性。     

Defence industries adjusting to change 1

This paper analyses the impact of terrorist activity on international tourist flows. To this end, we have estimated a cross‐sectional gravity equation for tourism from the G‐7 countries to a sample of 134 destinations over the period 2001–2003. Within this framework, we evaluate the deviation from ‘normal’ tourist flows due to terrorist activity, which is considered as negative advertising for the affected country. The analysis suggests that both domestic victims and international attacks are relevant factors when foreign tourists make their choice. This result is robust under alternative specifications. Moreover, the impact of terrorism is more severe in developing countries.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.