双二体几何切面法及天梯地月转移轨道分析

双二体模型是求解地月转移轨道的重要基础。与传统的采用月球影响球入口点经纬度的描述方式不同,本文提出一种基于飞行轨道面参数来描述地月转移轨道的双二体模型几何表达方式,结合一维非线性方程求根算法Brent算法和Lambert原理,将原始三维球面搜索算法降维成为二维圆上的搜索算法,可以高效求解地月转移轨道的形状参数。为避免重复计算,将转移轨道窗口计算的轨道多变量搜索问题解耦分解成两个子问题——转移轨道形状参数求解问题和转移轨道面空间定向问题,降低了问题的求解维度。形成两级并行计算算法,充分发挥多核计算机算力,加速计算过程。仿真结果表明,基于提出的并行圆锥曲线几何切面法,可以成功应用于计算天梯地月转移轨道分析。     

连续情形的窃贼问题

讨论了连续时间上的窃贼问题。Ｊｔ是［０,ｔ］上窃贼作案的次数,｛Ｊｔ｝ｔ≥０是Ｐｏｉｓ－ｓｏｎ过程;收获过程与风险过程都是独立同分布的时间序列。利用弱无穷小算子,我们找出了最优停时规则。     

基于时间窗的宽带阵列多目标干扰资源调度

随着宽带数字阵列技术和有源干扰技术的不断发展和成熟,舰载有源干扰设备的未来发展方向将是宽带数字阵列有源干扰系统。针对多目标干扰问题,提出了目标干扰时间窗概念和两种时间窗的处理方法,并建立干扰资源调度模型,通过仿真计算和对比分析,得出基于模糊时间窗的资源调度模型性能优于基于硬时间窗的资源调度模型,能够对干扰资源进行合理的调度,提高宽带阵列多目标干扰能力。     

变距离静电电位检测研究

针对现有非接触式静电检测装置存在检测距离近且距离固定等问题,提出了对电位测量进行距离补偿的变距离静电电位检测方案。首先,从电位测量的基本原理出发,分析了距离测量误差与电位测量误差的关系,验证了精确测距的重要性,即要满足电位测量相对误差σV≤±10%,所选测距方式的距离测量相对误差-4.65%≤σd0≤5.41%的技术指标。然后,通过实验研究了检测距离与感应电位的关系,验证了0.5 m内对静电电位变距离测量的可行性,得到了对电位测量进行距离补偿的公式雏形Vs(V a,d)=Va(a+bd)c。依据此公式雏形以及大量的重复实验,可以得到公式中的各项参数值,编入单片机可实现对静电电位的变距离检测。     

大学自习教室优化设置研究

针对目前大学自习教室资源浪费普遍存在的现象,将学生上自习与否视为独立同分布随机变量,从自习教室的管理与维护成本、电费成本以及学生的满意度3个方面出发,建立了双目标随机规划模型,并在模型基础上提出了大学自习教室设置的一般方法。通过实例分析,对模型的正确性和有效性进行了论证。结果表明:在各种情况下,该模型都能很好地解决自习教室设置这一问题,并且能在学生满意度较高的条件下,节约能源13%以上。该模型可以有效地对自习教室进行优化设置,不仅提高了资源利用水平,而且节约了能源。     

基于非线性聚合的多类型指标综合评估方法

针对多类型指标综合评估问题,将实数型、区间数型和模糊数型指标相结合,构建评估指标体系.采用区间数特征向量法和信息熵权法确定指标权重,并针对3种不同类型的指标分别定义了评分方法.引入非线性聚合理论,建立了基于非线性聚合的多类型指标综合评估指标体系.最后,以某型军事指挥信息系统的指挥控制能力评估为例,进行了实例运算,验证了该模型与方法的合理性和有效性.     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Generalized orienteering problem with resource dependent rewards

We introduce a generalized orienteering problem (OP) where, as usual, a vehicle is routed from a prescribed start node, through a directed network, to a prescribed destination node, collecting rewards at each node visited, to maximize the total reward along the path. In our generalization, transit on arcs in the network and reward collection at nodes both consume a variable amount of the same limited resource. We exploit this resource trade‐off through a specialized branch‐and‐bound algorithm that relies on partial path relaxation problems that often yield tight bounds and lead to substantial pruning in the enumeration tree. We present the smuggler search problem (SSP) as an important real‐world application of our generalized OP. Numerical results show that our algorithm applied to the SSP outperforms standard mixed‐integer nonlinear programming solvers for moderate to large problem instances. We demonstrate model enhancements that allow practitioners to represent realistic search planning scenarios by accounting for multiple heterogeneous searchers and complex smuggler motion. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013