Generation and storage dispatch in electricity networks with generator disruptions

We present methods for optimizing generation and storage decisions in an electricity network with multiple unreliable generators, each colocated with one energy storage unit (e.g., battery), and multiple loads under power flow constraints. Our model chooses the amount of energy produced by each generator and the amount of energy stored in each battery in every time period in order to minimize power generation and storage costs when each generator faces stochastic Markovian supply disruptions. This problem cannot be optimized easily using stochastic programming and/or dynamic programming approaches. Therefore, in this study, we present several heuristic methods to find an approximate optimal solution for this system. Each heuristic involves decomposing the network into several single‐generator, single‐battery, multiload systems and solving them optimally using dynamic programming, then obtaining a solution for the original problem by recombining. We discuss the computational performance of the proposed heuristics as well as insights gained from the models. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 493–511, 2015     

废旧轮胎在新型柔性拦石墙结构中的应用与数值分析

废旧轮胎作为新型柔性拦石墙结构的重要组成部分,研究其组成材料及抗冲击性能具有重要意义。采用ANSYS/LS-DYNA软件,以子午线轮胎175/70R14为基础,建立了废旧轮胎和刚性拦石墙上添加废旧轮胎前后的有限元模型,分别考察了2种情况下刚性拦石墙所受落石冲击力的大小,研究了废旧轮胎各部分材料的耗能特点。数值分析表明:废旧轮胎吸能作用明显,能够有效地减缓落石对刚性拦石墙的冲击,并显著提高新型柔性拦石墙的防护能力。     

高空长航时太阳能飞机研究进展与技术挑战

高空长航时太阳能飞机是当前的前沿热点方向,可实现月量级的长期驻空,并形成“时间持久+区域保持”的新型应用能力。系统总结了高空长航时太阳能飞机三阶段发展历程,包括初期探索阶段、快速发展阶段、实用能力验证与应用示范阶段,重点阐述国外典型发展计划,深入分析气动布局设计、储能电池、高空推进、大尺度结构、飞行控制等面临的主要技术挑战,并提出重点攻关方向建议,为高空长航时太阳能飞机创新发展提供参考。     

定向能武器技术的发展动向

随着激光、新材料、微电子、声光、电光等高技术的发展,利用各种束能产生强大杀伤威力的定向能武器已引起世界高度重视。定向能武器成为战场上高速移动目标的"克星",是能有效制敌的"杀手锏"装备,对未来作战样式和形态具有重要影响。文章系统分析了定向能武器的军事应用前景,详细剖析了世界定向能武器技术的研究进展及发展动向,给出了未来要大力发展的激光武器、高功率微波武器和粒子束武器关键技术,对于加快我军定向能武器装备发展,提升非对称制衡能力,具有十分重要的意义。     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

A Proliferation of Royal Air Forces

Australia's interest in nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s is usually explained in terms of high politics and grand strategy. This proliferation case study explores, in greater detail than hitherto, the important part played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in pressing for a nuclear capability. It seeks to understand the reasons behind the RAAF's lobbying, in particular its previous experience with air power, its visceral desire for advanced manned bomber aircraft, and its strong institutional link to the British Royal Air Force. The decision in 1963 to acquire the supersonic US F-111 strike aircraft, instead of rivals including the British TSR.2, is also considered. Once the RAAF's bomber ambitions were satisfied, interest in nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Finally, some comments are included on the nuclear interests of other air forces in the British Commonwealth.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.