概率风险评估在核电站消防安全管理中的应用

介绍了概率风险评估与火灾概率风险评估的基本概念,详细论述了概率风险评估的主要内容及其在核电站火灾安全管理中的应用。     

广州日总太阳辐射估算

利用广州十年内（1995—2004）的气象数据,进行了逐步回归分析,得出估算日总太阳辐射的模型。并通过平均百分误差、平均偏差和均方根误差对各模型的精确性进行了对比,选择出最优模型。最后用实测的日总太阳辐射数据对选出的最优模型进行验证,结果表明,当日总太阳辐射值较大时,模型估算值与实测数据吻合得很好。     

加筋板在横向撞击下的吸能特性研究

运用非线性有限元分析方法,对不同撞击工况下加筋板的碰撞损伤过程进行了分析。加筋板结构采用理想弹塑性的材料模型,不计入应变率对材料强化的影响,在忽略接触面的摩擦等因素影响的前提下,考虑加筋板结构在刚性体碰撞下的变形过程,从而探讨加筋板结构的动态响应特点。研究结果表明,加筋板的吸能特性与撞击因素有一定的关系。非线性动态计算采用MSC/DYTRAN程序完成。     

空间信息支持高能激光武器应用研究*

依据空间信息支持现代作战的主要内容,介绍了五大类空间信息状况,分析了新概念武器高能激光的基本原理,并就其应用过程建立了UML模型。在此基础上,设计了空间信息支持高能激光武器应用系统的框架,并就高能激光武器对空间信息的需求进行了重点分析,而后以信息的转换与传递为主线,探讨了高能激光武器运用空间信息的流程。最后对该领域研究的趋势和发展前景做出了展望,并提出对其未来发展的要求。     

基于水下声场信息的三维航路规划研究

针对目前大规模水下复杂战场环境中的航路规划困难的问题。设计了一种以距离值传递法为基础的航路规划方法,该方法以水下声场为主要威胁源,运用三维抛物方程(PE)模型计算水下声场数据,并以此建立三维水下战场环境。利用限制线性八叉树的方法对数据场进行数据分割,从而达到对搜索空间的压缩,最后通过距离值传递法搜索得到最佳航路。仿真结果表明该方法较快的实现了三维声场环境下的不同起始点、多目标寻径,满足一定条件下航路规划要求。     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.     

Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea

ABSTRACT

This article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program.