核裂变过程动态模拟计算的动力学系数

本文利用(c,h,a)三参数旋转体模型计算了形变核的相对表面能、相对库仑能及相对转动能。这些相对能量与具体核无关,具有普适性,可以用于核裂变动态过程的模拟计算。利用这些结果,计算了一些核的形变位能随三参数变化的情况,给出了裂变位垒高度,与实验结果符合较好。对~(236)U的形变位能曲面作了较详细的分析,得出一些有益的结论。用Werner—Wheeler方法计算了形变核的惯性质量和粘滞张量随三参数变化情况,对断点线方程作了深入讨论,为核裂变动态过程的计算机模拟准备了必要的系数。     

抗电磁干扰高分子材料的研究与应用

通过对电磁波干扰的现象分析,阐述了屏蔽作用原理及屏蔽方法,研究了表面导电材料和导电复合材料等抗电磁干扰高分子材料的性能、工艺及其屏蔽效果,并对它们的应用与发展前景进行了讨论。     

微型计算机在复合材料强度准则研究中的应用

文中论述了运用微型计算机(IBM-PC)进行复合材料强度准则研究的方法,包括强度包络线绘制、双向加载数据采集及实验数据处理等,同时还研究了如何确定双向试验中的破坏载荷值,并在分析实例中提供了较详细的数据。     

Robust shortest path problems with two uncertain multiplicative cost coefficients

We consider a robust shortest path problem when the cost coefficient is the product of two uncertain factors. We first show that the robust problem can be solved in polynomial time by a dual‐variable enumeration with shortest path problems as subproblems. We also propose a path enumeration approach using a K ‐shortest paths finding algorithm that may be efficient in many real cases. An application in hazardous materials transportation is discussed, and the solution methods are illustrated by numerical examples. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.     

FACILITATING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production

Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: An Emerging International Norm?

ABSTRACT

There have been calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons from the day they were invented. Over the last fifteen years, some indications can be found that such calls have been getting louder, among them Barack Obama's famous 2009 speech in Prague. In this article, we investigate if support for a comprehensive norm that would prohibit development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons is really growing. To assess the current status of that norm, we use the model of a “norm life cycle,” developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. We then analyze 6,545 diplomatic statements from the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as from the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, covering the years 2000 to 2013. The evidence shows that a comprehensive prohibition can be considered an emerging international norm that finds growing support among states without nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states alike. Only a core group of states invoke the norm consistently, however. This leads us to conclude that the “tipping point” of the life cycle, at which adherence to a new norm starts to spread rapidly, has yet to be reached.