Formation and characterization of core-shell CL-20/TNT composite prepared by spray-drying technique

The core-shell 2,4,6,8,10,12-Hexanitro-2,4,6,8,10,12-hexaazaisowurtzitane/2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (CL-20/TNT) composite was prepared by spray-drying method in which sensitive high energy explosive (CL-20) was coated with insensitive explosive (TNT). The structure and properties of different formulations of CL-20/TNT composite and CL-20/TNT mixture were characterized by scanning electron microscopy (SEM), Transmission electron microscopy (TEM), Laser particle size analyzer, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), X-ray diffraction (XRD), differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), impact sensitivity test and detonation performance. The results of SEM, TEM, XPS and XRD show that ϵ-CL-20 particles are coated by TNT. When the ratio of CL-20/TNT is 75/25, core-shell structure is well formed, and thickness of the shell is about 20–30 nm. And the analysis of heat and impact show that with the increase of TNT content, the TNT coating on the core-shell composite material can not only catalyze the thermal decomposition of core material (CL-20), but also greatly reduce the impact sensitivity. Compared with the CL-20/TNT mixture (75/25) at the same ratio, the characteristic drop height of core-shell CL-20/TNT composite (75/25) increased by 47.6% and the TNT coating can accelerate the nuclear decomposition in the CL-20/TNT composites. Therefore, the preparation of the core-shell composites can be regarded as a unique means, by which the composites are characterized by controllable decomposition rate, high energy and excellent mechanical sensitivity and could be applied to propellants and other fields.     

Critical interfaces in body armour systems

The ballistic performance, and behaviour, of an armour system is governed by two major sets of variables, geometrical and material. Of these, the consistency of performance, especially against small arms ammunition, will depend upon the consistency of the properties of the constituent materials. In a body armour system for example, fibre diameter, areal density of woven fabric, and bulk density of ceramic are examples of critical parameters and monitoring such parameters will form the backbone of associated quality control procedures. What is often overlooked, because it can fall into the User’s domain, are the interfaces that exist between the various products; the carrier, the Soft Armour Insert (SAI), and the one or two hard armour plates (HAP1 and HAP2). This is especially true if the various products are sourced from different suppliers.There are between 30 and 150 individual layers within a typical body armour system, and each of the interfaces between each of those layers will, in some way or another, contribute to the ballistic performance of the system. For example, consider the following interfaces/interlayers: (i) the frictional, sliding, inter-ply surfaces within a soft armour pack, and also between the pack and the carrier, (ii) the air-gaps that may develop within the soft armour pack, (iii) the interconnecting space between the soft armour pack and the hard armour plate, (iv) the nature of the interfaces between adjacent plies of a multiplied backing laminate, even in a highly compressed Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) variant, (v) the interlayer between the ceramic and its substrate, within a HAP, and (vi) the geometrical fit between two hard armour plates within a stacked body armour system. This paper will provide a User-friendly overview of all such interfaces and provide unique guidance as to their criticality and influence.     

舰艇隐身材料的现状及发展趋势

综述了隐身材料的现状和发展趋势,包括雷达隐身材料、光电隐身材料、声隐身材料和降磁材料,并介绍了几种有发展前途的新型隐身材料.     

Goodbye to all that? Institutionalist theory,U.S. alliances,and Donald Trump

In an important and stimulating article, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil argue in favor of applying institutionalist theory to understand the alliance politics of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. But what promise does institutionalist theory really hold in thinking about highly unequal alliances nested in their particular threat environments? I argue that much work remains to be done to determine how much better institutionalist variables explain intra-alliance dynamics over alternative arguments that emphasize power and interests. Balances of power and the nature of threat environments may already account for key aspects of extended deterrent relationships supported by the United States in Europe and Asia. Ironically, the implication of this more traditional interpretation of alliances is that more continuity than change will characterize how Donald Trump will manage U.S. security relationships as President.     

Putin and Russia in retro and forward: the nuclear dimension

Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia’s status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.     

应急航材配送网络需求缓冲策略设计

航空装备是空军武器装备的主体,做好航材保障工作对于充分发挥装备作战效能,确保装备的作战使用具有重要意义。描述了应急需求冲击条件下缓冲控制问题,建立了应急航材配送网络影响缓存因素模型,进而建立了完整的应急航材需求冲击的缓冲策略设计框架,并进行了应急航材缓存分配建模。分别采用BP-GA方法对应急航材需求进行测算;保噪正态分布进行了缓冲策略公式的推演,需求冲能模型进行了单个缓存分配,并结合算例说明了其有效性。     

圆柱形微带天线的复合材料设计

本文介绍了满足微带天线使用温度要求的聚合物基复合材料设计的方法与过程。按照这种方法,设计并制造了一批微带天线产品,经高低温测试,证明都符合设计要求。     

Coating processes towards selective laser sintering of energetic material composites

This research aims to contribute to the safe methodology for additive manufacturing (AM) of energetic materials. Coating formulation processes were investigated and evaluated to find a suitable method that may enable selective laser sintering (SLS) as the safe method for fabrication of high explosive (HE) compositions. For safety and convenience reasons, the concept demonstration was conducted using inert explosive simulants with properties quasi-similar to the real HE. Coating processes for simulant RDX-based microparticles by means of PCL and 3,4,5-trimethoxybenzaldehyde (as TNT simulant) are reported. These processes were evaluated for uniformity of coating the HE inert simulant particles with binder materials to facilitate the SLS as the adequate binding and fabrication method. Suspension system and single emulsion methods gave required particle near spherical morphology, size and uniform coating. The suspension process appears to be suitable for the SLS of HE mocks and potential formulation methods for active HE composites. The density is estimated to be comparable with the current HE compositions and plastic bonded explosives (PBXs) such as C4 and PE4, produced from traditional methods. The formulation method developed and understanding of the science behind the processes paves the way toward safe SLS of the active HE compositions and may open avenues for further research and development of munitions of the future.     

核电磁脉冲模拟器的电场特性及等离子体阵列的防护性能

强电磁脉冲通过电子设备表面耦合进入内部将产生显著的破坏作用,而等离子体作为一种特殊的电磁介质,具有屏蔽强电磁脉冲的能力,因此基于等离子体的强电磁脉冲防护研究具有重要意义。利用CST软件仿真分析了核电磁脉冲模拟器工作空间的电场分布。进行了核电磁脉冲对单片机的干扰和破坏效应辐照研究,得到了其对MF-51-1型单片机的干扰和破坏阈值分别在10 kV/m和18 kV/m左右。实验研究了单层等离子体阵列对核电磁脉冲的防护性能,能量衰减均在10 dB以上。实验结果表明,等离子体具有强电磁脉冲防护的能力。     

(Un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear NATO members: the case of Estonia and Latvia?

ABSTRACT

Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.