重庆市近11年空气污染指数变化的小波变换分析

运用一维连续Morlet小波变换法分析重庆市近11年逐日空气污染指数的多尺度演变特征、主周期、突变点和变化因素。结果表明:重庆市空气污染指数在不同时间尺度有不同的变化规律,变化主周期为300 d左右;空气污染状况受地形和气象因素影响,呈"冬重夏轻"格局;春分、秋分前后是一年中空气污染轻重状况转换的突变点;2005年后重庆市空气污染逐渐减轻,但冬季有加重趋势。实践证明,小波变换法是研究空气污染指数时间序列变化的有效分析方法。     

(Un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear NATO members: the case of Estonia and Latvia?

ABSTRACT

Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.     

论环境侵权民事责任的构成要件

随着社会经济的发展,环境污染已成为一个不能回避的社会话题。国家要想在将来寻求长远的发展,必须在现有立法的基础上,进一步完善环境保护的法律机制,从而实现社会的和谐。从环境侵权民事责任构成要件角度出发,阐述了如何保护受害人的合法权益,如何在经济发展的同时从根本上正确处理人与自然环境之间的关系。     

朝核问题对中国边境安全的影响

朝核问题一直是困扰东北亚地区安全的核心问题,自20世纪90年代第一次朝核危机至今．朝核问题不但没有得到妥善解决,反而更加复杂。2006年10月9日,朝鲜宣布成功进行了地下核试验,朝鲜半岛再一次成为全球关注的焦点。在前人研究的基础上,就朝核问题产生的背景,朝核问题对中国边境地区经济、地区稳定以及生态环境等方面产生的影响进行分析和探讨。     

化工火灾引发环境污染的分析及预防——由吉林石化分公司爆炸火灾引发的思考

介绍了中石油吉林石化分公司双苯厂“11·13”爆炸事故和松花江水污染事件的基本情况。分析了这起典型污染事件的成因,提出预防火灾爆炸事故造成环境污染的对策。     

核动力装置的(火用)分析

针对压水堆、沸水堆、气冷堆、钠冷堆核动力装置的实际过程,建立了最简单的热动力学模型.利用热力学第二定律建立的火用分析方法,对核动力装置中主要的热量传递、作功与受功过程的不可逆性进行了分析.文中以A型和B型电站压水堆核动力装置为实例进行的火用损失与火用效率的对比计算表明反应堆内裂变能从裂变碎片到燃料的传递过程是整个核动力力装置火用损失最大的地方,其次是堆内燃料元件导热过程,然后依次是汽轮机、蒸发器、冷凝器、管路、泵.而火用效率最低的地方是冷凝器,其次是汽轮机、堆内燃料元件、蒸发器.     

船用堆核事故状态下源项特性及计算方法研究

对船用堆核事故状态下的源项特性进行了描述,并对源项估算的数学模型和计算方法进行了研究和探讨;提出了快速估算法,进行了比对计算;在计算过程中对一些不确定参数用核电站的值代替,并采取适当的缩放,简化了计算过程.计算结果表明这样处理是可靠的.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.