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581.
Giorgio Franceschini Matthias Englert Wolfgang Liebert 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):525-544
Fusion reactors have the potential to be used for military purposes. This article provides quantitative estimates about weapon-relevant materials produced in future commercial fusion reactors and discusses how suitable such materials are for use in nuclear weapons. Whether states will consider such use in the future will depend on specific regulatory, political, economic, and technical boundary conditions. Based on expert interviews and the political science literature, we identify three of these conditions that could determine whether fusion power will have a military dimension in the second half of this century: first, the technological trajectory of global energy policies; second, the management of a peaceful power transition between rising and declining powers; and third, the overall acceptance of the nuclear normative order. Finally, the article discusses a few regulatory options that could be implemented by the time fusion reactors reach technological maturity and become commercially available; such research on fusion reactor safeguards should start as early as possible and accompany the current research on experimental fusion reactors. 相似文献
582.
Peter Jones 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):197-217
Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces. 相似文献
583.
James Clay Moltz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):327-331
15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation, by L. Douglas Keeney. St. Martin's Press, 2011. 384 pages, $27. 相似文献
584.
Toshihiro Higuchi 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):83-116
The idea of ‘clean’ bombs, nuclear weapons with a reduced amount of radioactive fallout resulting from their fission part, has met much ridicule since its public inauguration in 1956. Many scholars have regarded the bombs as a propaganda tool, stopping short of analyzing their role in the transformative phase of US nuclear strategy in the 1950s. This paper reexamines the clean bomb episode through 1958, shedding light upon the dynamic relationship between the development of nuclear weapons technology and the evolution of nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. It also discusses the mechanism and momentum of nuclear weapons technology innovation until the US suspended nuclear testing in late 1958. 相似文献
585.
586.
针对功率放大器的非线性特性及记忆效应,提出了一种基于记忆有理函数的功放行为模型。在传统记忆多项式模型和无记忆有理函数模型基础上,构建记忆有理函数模型,并利用共轭梯度法辨识模型系数,同时比较不同记忆深度和不同非线性阶数下的归一化均方误差,获取最佳记忆深度和非线性阶数。采用多载波的WCDMA信号和MRF6S21140H功放来验证模型的有效性,并与记忆多项式模型、无记忆有理函数模型进行了比较。结果表明,记忆有理函数模型在减少系数数目的同时具有更好的逼近精度。 相似文献
587.
分析了传统二元逻辑应用于核动力装置部分失效技术状态评估时的局限性,概述了Mamdani模糊推理的基本技术;结合状态评估实例,提出了基于Mamdani模糊推理的核动力装置系统级的技术状态评估方法,为系统部分失效的技术状态评估提供了一种新的技术途径。 相似文献
588.
采用同心环波纹碟片填料和不锈钢波纹丝网两种填料,在气液逆流CO2吸收操作时,对旋转床的功耗及气体压降进行了对比实验分析。功耗特性对比结果表明,当液流量不变,旋转床转速低于38 rad/s时,丝网填料旋转床吸收器消耗的功率大于碟片填料旋转床吸收器消耗的功率;转速高于38 rad/s时则相反。气体压降特性对比结果表明,在液流量和旋转床转速不变的操作条件下,碟片填料旋转床的气体压降要大于丝网填料旋转床的气体压降约50 Pa;在气流量和转速不变的操作条件下,当液流量较小时,丝网填料旋转床的气体压降大于碟片填料旋转床的气体压降;当液流量较大时则相反。在相同气流量和液流量下,碟片旋转床气体压降要大于丝网填料旋转床气体压降。研究结果为AIP系统旋转床吸收器的填料优选及全系统的优化设计提供了重要的依据。 相似文献
589.
Jo-Ansie van Wyk 《African Security Review》2014,23(4):381-394
African states' attendance at and participation in the preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has produced mixed results, with the continent acting as both agent and bystander in respect of certain issues. African agency is evident in, for example, its position as a member of groupings on Iran's nuclear weapons programme and the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Less agency is evident in states' individual actions. This underscores the importance of African states' preference for multilateralism. However, African agency is also less evident in African multilateral efforts at the NPT preparatory meetings. The impact of these developments on the 2015 NPT Review Conference is too soon to tell but may bode ill for African agency. 相似文献
590.
Anuar Ayazbekov 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(2):149-168
This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period. 相似文献