信息熵与TOPSIS装备保障力量部署方案优化

针对装备保障力量部署方案复杂性和模糊性特点,在分析装备保障力量部署的内容、影响因素及方案优化目的基础上,建立了装备保障力量部署方案评估指标体系,采用信息熵理论来确定评估指标的权重,并提出了基于熵权TOPS IS的装备保障力量部署方案优选方法,使装备保障力量部署方案决策更加科学合理,具有一定的实用性。     

未来30年太空安全发展趋势及影响

“太空安全战略”专题编者按 组稿专家：杨乐平（国防科技大学空天科学学院教授、博士生导师） 近年来,以美国重建太空司令部与天军独立为标志,国际太空领域战略竞争与军事对抗日益加剧,太空前所未有地应用于军事与安全,太空安全也受到了前所未有的挑战。为了解未来太空安全发展和主要国家太空安全战略动向,深化太空安全战略研究,《国防科技》编辑部于2021年6月启动“太空安全战略”专题征文活动,国内相关学者积极投稿,经专家遴选,本期发表入选稿件6篇。来稿内容涵盖未来30年太空安全发展预测、美国太空安全最新发展、俄罗斯太空安全政策、欧盟太空安全政策、日本太空安全战略以及印度太空力量发展等主题,较为全面地反映了当前国际太空安全领域的最新发展与战略动向。从长远看,随着地球以外人类活动的增加、太空新经济蓬勃发展和太空创造财富规模不断扩大,水平大幅提升,太空将超越陆、海、空成为国家安全最重要的领域。从这个意义上讲,太空安全战略研究学术价值与影响较大,值得高度关注。     

基于MSP430单片机的海浪水压场自动测量系统

提出了基于MSP430单片机的水压场自动测量系统的设计方案和实现方法并进行了实际测量.解决了自动测量系统中的低噪声、低功耗、高分辨率、大容量存储等关键技术.实验结果表明:该系统具有自动运行、电池供电、记录时间长等特点.适于高海况条件下的海浪水压场的测量.     

具有热阻、热漏和内不可逆性的联合卡诺热机生态学优化

用有限时间热力学的方法分析具有热阻、热漏、内不可逆性的定常流联合卡诺型热机循环.导出了在傅立叶导热定律下联合循环功率、效率和生态学指标的性能,并进行优化;得到功率、效率和生态学指标之间的优化关系,并由数值计算分析了功率、效率和循环熵产率之间的关系.所得的结果表明,最大生态学指标下的效率十分接近于联合循环可以达到的最大效率;相应的熵产率也要低于以输出功率为优化目标时的熵产率.     

How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III

Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III. Simon & Schuster, 2011. 305 pages, $28.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.     

OF HAWKS AND DOVES

The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITALY: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations

Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports.     

PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.