一种扩展密钥空间的改进型DES算法设计及其应用

针对典型DES具有密钥短等缺点,提出了一种基于Logistic映射的改进型DES算法,提高了密钥空间,增强了密文输出的混乱特性。同时,将该算法应用于远程装备监控系统中,有效地增强了数据传输的安全性。     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

基于本体技术的分布式模拟训练系统操作监控平台

针对分布式模拟训练系统操作训练特点,在基于HLA（High Level Architecture）的模拟训练系统中,提出并建立了基于本体技术的操作训练监控平台,解决了训练系统和监控平台中操作消息的语义异构问题,实现了操作训练情况的动态实时显示。在平台实现中,采用RTI（Run-Time Infrastructure）提供的服务实现了联邦数据收发;建立了操作信息领域本体,采用计算语义相似度的方法实现操作信息由分布交互层向语义层映射;通过专家知识库和操作监控引擎判断操作逻辑合理性;利用View Graph以图形化的方式展示出操作训练情况。最后,通过一个炮车操作训练监控实例,验证了该平台的可行性和有效性。     

二阶阶跃畸变模型下的卫星自主完好性监测接收机测距精度分析

测距精度是评估卫星自主完好性监测接收机在导航信号畸变环境下工作性能的一个重要指标。推导了卫星自主完好性监测接收机在国际民航组织二阶阶跃畸变模型下采用早晚相干跟踪处理时测距精度与畸变模型参数的解析表达式,理论分析和仿真结果表明数字畸变将导致接收机伪码鉴相器输出曲线存在过零点偏差,数字畸变量基本不影响接收机测距方差;模拟畸变将扭曲相关峰函数和鉴相器输出曲线,但鉴相器输出基本上不存在过零点偏差,模拟畸变参数、前端滤波器带宽和早晚码间距共同影响接收机的测距方差。     

双源连续波对引信的辐照效应研究

为研究复杂电磁环境对某引信的影响,从双源连续波入手,运用双源连续波对工作状态某引信辐照的实验方法进行实验.实验结果表明,在以引信工作频率为中心的150MHz频率范围内对加电引信进行双源连续波辐照实验可使引信发火,辐照结束后引信工作正常,实验的重复性较好.两连续波频率间隔不同,可使引信发火的场强组合数值大小不相同,实验中当两连续波远离引信工作频率且频差10MHz以上时,发火场强组合近似呈线性.最后对双源连续波对引信的辐照效应机理作了分析,两连续波频率间隔不同,引信发火机理不同.     

Regional integration and nuclear energy in Africa

African states are hampered by unreliable electric energy that has not complemented economic development efforts. Recently, several African states announced plans to pursue nuclear energy in the future. However, several challenges remain for these states, notably insecurity and financial deficiencies. This paper proposes the use of regional integration arrangements to address these challenges faced by African states, as a way of complementing other efforts enabling African states to obtain nuclear energy. The existence of these arrangements and their institutional mechanisms can enable African states to enhance security and cost-effectively develop nuclear power infrastructure.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

SPARRING ON THE SUBCONTINENT

South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime, by Mario Esteban Carranza. Ashgate, 2009. 208 pages, $99.95.     

ATOMS FOR PEACE

Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, Cornell University Press, 2012, 344 pages, $29.95.