压水型核反应堆功率控制系统的优化设计

在分析了压水型反应堆功率控制系统的前提下,针对其特殊的控制要求,运用基于输出反馈的次最优控制的设计方法和Matlab中的NCD模块,最终实现了系统的优化设计,并对系统进行了某一功率水平下的仿真试验和其它工况下的鲁棒性试验.结果表明,改进后的系统性能有了较大改善.     

航空核辐射侦察信息更新率分析

分析了航空核辐射侦察信息的时序关系,结合相关测量设备的发展现状,认为更新率应以水平定位信息为准。分析了侦察过程中定位设备的各种工作状态,指出了其最优工作状态。最后在此工作状态下依据现实可用的定位设备给出了信息更新率。     

论马克思主义哲学在当代中国的发展——从“革命的哲学”到“建设的哲学”

实现从"革命的哲学"到"建设的哲学"的转变,是马克思主义哲学在当代中国发展的显著标志和巨大成果,是中国共产党人对"马克思主义过时论"做出的最有说服力的应答.正确把握马克思主义哲学的精神实质和宗旨,是实现这一转变的逻辑前提;准确揭示、大力弘扬马克思主义哲学的理论精髓,是实现这一转变的关键;明确"和平与发展"的时代主题,不断深化对"三个规律"的认识,是实现这一转变的显著标志.     

The Problem of Weak Nuclear States

Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality.     

关于颠覆性技术发展的理性认知

随着美国揭开第三次\"抵消战略\"重点发展对象的面纱,研发\"颠覆性技术\"已成为主要军事大国获得技术优势的手段。当前世界新一轮科技革命、产业革命、军事革命交织并行,给颠覆性技术提供了难得的良好机遇。但当我们看见颠覆性技术引领时代新型武器装备潮流发展的同时,也应理性看待其背后潜藏的风险。通过概述总结颠覆性技术研究现状,分析其推动的科技内生性变革,从本质上对其进行理性认知。研究表明,发展颠覆性技术必须积极作为,谨慎对待。     

新一轮科技革命孕育发展的动向及思考

当今世界正处于新科技革命的前夜,变革突破的能量正在不断积累。本文分析新一轮科技革命孕育发展的基本动因,梳理主要军事强国把握科技革命机遇推动科技创新的主要做法,提出新时期加强我国国防科技创新发展的几点思考。     

Dynamic institutionalization: the foundations of Japan’s radioactive problem

Many have suggested that the true purpose behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear-fuel cycle is to maintain the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons. However, closer examination of the development of Japan’s nuclear industry shows that, although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technologies, there has been no deliberate strategy to create a nuclear-weapon option. There is no “nuclear hedge.” To illustrate this point, this article presents a framework called “dynamic institutionalization” to explain the origins of Japan’s nuclear policies and the different sets of institutionalized pressures and constraints that have perpetuated these policies over time. Japan’s continued development of closed fuel-cycle technologies is primarily driven by domestic politics and the lack of a permanent spent-fuel management solution. On the other hand, Japan’s institutionalized nuclear forbearance is driven by the calculation that, as long as US extended deterrence remains credible, Japan’s security is best guaranteed through reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. By analytically untangling the policy of closed fuel-cycle development from the rationale for nuclear forbearance, this article provides a more nuanced view of the relationships between the domestic and international variables shaping Japan’s nuclear policies.