UK firms’ experience and perceptions of defence offsets: Survey results 1

Offsets are a growing feature of international trade in defence equipment. This article assesses the economics of offsets and outlines UK offsets policy. There is a lack of empirical work in the field and the article presents the results of a survey of UK firms’ experience of their involvement in offsets against UK imports of defence equipment. There is also a case study of the AWACS offset programme and an evaluation of policy implications.     

On the nature and scope of defence economics

Defence economics uses the tools of economics to study the defence sector and its domestic and international implications. Simple models require careful application in defence economics, since indirect effects may have counterintuitive impacts. For example, while certain arms races can lead to the outbreak of war, others may have the counterintuitive effect of discouraging the outbreak of war owing to mutual deterrence.

The world is now multipolar rather than bipolar, analogous to an oligopoly situation. This multipolar world can be analyzed by a qualitative characteristic function, where the formation of a potential coalition allows study of the shift from conflict to cooperation in international relations. Some new issues to be considered in this framework include accidental nuclear war, potential arms races and conflicts in the third world, and the proliferation of chemical weapons and missiles.     

基于秘密共享的卫星网络组密钥管理方案

针对卫星网络组密钥管理的重要性,提出了一个可认证的基于门限秘密共享的组密钥管理方案．结合卫星网络的动态拓扑结构特点,将地面站作为组成员的身份注册中心,以实现对组成员的身份认证,确保节点的合法性．为了提高组密钥的生成效率,选取≠一1颗可见时间长的卫星构建组密钥份额分发中心,降低了组密钥联合生成过程中的通信量．组密钥协商无需安全信道,节省了系统资源．安全性及性能分析表明,该方案不仅具有较强的安全性,而且还具有计算和通信量小的优点．参数分析表明,门限值k与组密钥更新周期T是影响方案安全性的2个重要因子．     

NUCLEAR BOMB SQUAD

Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad, by Jeffrey T. Richelson. W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. 318 pages, $27.95.     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

应急器材柔性采购定价建模与求解

由于当前应急器材储备依然存在“多储”或“少储”风险,为提高储备效益,以企业经济效益与军队采购成本为优化目标,提出了应急器材柔性采购策略。通过建立企业储备策略与军队采购定价最优化模型,求解得到了在不同战争爆发概率及器材现货市场价格区间等外部环境因素下的军队最佳柔性定价及对应的企业最优储备策略,并通过实例分析验证了得出的决策结论。结果表明,最优策略的实施将有利于军队与企业共担应急器材数量储备风险。     

航天测控软件共用技术研究与实现

软件共用是航天测控软件的发展趋势,分析了航天测控软件共用的可行性,并选取火箭遥测软件作为原型验证系统,提出了解决方案和设计方法,采用ICE中间件和构件技术实现了该原型验证系统,经测试验证,分布式部署的原型验证软件各项指标满足测控任务软件的技术要求,对航天测控软件共用研究具有重要的借鉴和指导意义。     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.