Russia,America and missile defense

Russia has sharply objected to US plans for ballistic missile defense. The Russian official explanation is that the real purpose of the US missile defense plan is to make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack, thus making Russia subject to military blackmail by the US. The Russian response has been the result of a sum total of various factors, mostly political and cultural, while the technical capabilities of the proposed system have played a secondary role.     

船用核反应堆提棒外推临界优化研究

因稳定时间受限,传统的倍增公式导出的外推临界公式计算结果大于实测值,偏危险;文中根据新的中子倍增公式导出了外推临界计算的新公式,实例计算表明,该公式比传统的外推临界公式精确且偏安全.     

基于区块链的装备数据安全共享方案研究

军事装备大数据是实现军事现代化、智能化的基础,其中,数据共享对实现装备可视化管理、整合装备供应链、优化指挥控制系统等具有至关重要的作用。军事装备数据涉及核心机密,数据的安全共享问题是导致这些技术发展迟缓的关键因素之一。区块链是一种具有去中心化、不可篡改、稳定可靠等特性的分布式链式账本技术,利用区块链技术和云计算可以保障装备数据安全,在军事领域有着广阔的发展前景。本文面向装备数据安全共享业务开展研究,探讨利用基于属性加密技术和智能合约技术解决不同主体间的信任问题,并提出了基于区块链的装备数据安全共享方案,以打破传统装备系统中的“信息孤岛”现象。     

核污染的危害及其去除方法

核污染已成为全球十大环境难题之一,成了人类摆脱不掉的阴影.论述了核污染设施的核污染去除方法如物理法、化学法、电化学法、物理-化学联用法、微生物清除法、焚烧、超级压缩法和土壤核污染去除方法如铲土去污、深翻客土、可剥离性膜、森林修复等,并分析了各种去除方法的优缺点,最后提出了加强管理削减核污染源、加强现有处理方法的联用、开发微生物处理新技术和开发基因工程修复植物的建议.     

基于构件的软件复用技术在防化软件中的应用

软件复用是在软件开发过程中避免重复劳动的解决方案。通过构件的形式来实现软件复用,可以提高开发的效率和质量。以核侦察处理模块的实现和集成为例,介绍了基于构件的复用技术在目前信息化建设中的使用手段和方法。     

基于Elman神经网络的NSG水位特性辨识方法研究

针对核动力蒸汽发生器在瞬态、启动和低功率下的“收缩”与“膨胀”现象引起的逆动力学效应使核动力蒸汽发生器水位特性难以辨识的问题,提出了基于Elman神经网络的NSG水位特性辨识的新方法.采用串-并联型辨识结构,以保证辨识的收敛性和稳定性.网络训练采用Levenberg-Marququardt BP学习算法.仿真结果表明,所提出的方法能够正确地辨识核动力蒸汽发生器的水位特性,且具有较高的辨识精度.     

潜艇核事故应急评价模式研究

评价模式是核事故应急评价系统的核心．在理论分析的基础上,建立了适合基地特点的潜艇核事故应急评价模式及参数,并通过假想事故对所建立的评价模式进行了校核．结果表明,该模式具有良好的可靠性和可行性,适合基地的特点,满足核潜艇核事故应急评价的要求．根据所建模式,还编制了一套实用、可靠、灵活、方便的应用软件．     

计算jn 组态总角动量J 允许值的递推方法

计算j~n组态总角动量J的允许值通常采用列举法,对j,n大的组态计算十分繁琐。本文提出计算j~n组态J的允许值的递推方法,使计算大为简化。在VAX-11/730机上完成J=1/2～15/2分类的CPU时间,用本文方法为3秒,用列举法[1]为1分50秒。列出了j=1/2～15/2分类结果,并发现文献[2]表6有三处差错。     

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.     

Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.