基于多Agent协作的战场信息共享系统研究与实现

针对联合作战中分布、动态的战场环境和海量的战场信息,满足不同作战实体对战场信息资源共享的需求,构建了一个基于多智能体的、面向作战任务的信息资源共享模型,并提出了一种新颖的基于相似度的用户动态聚类方法。从用户的资源请求中发现用户兴趣和用户之间的相似度,通过交互机制有效地将相同兴趣的用户及资源智能体关联起来,提高作战主体获取战场信息的能力。实验证明该算法具有较高的效率和良好的可扩展性。     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

Combating nuclear smuggling? Exploring drivers and challenges to detecting nuclear and radiological materials at maritime facilities

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.     

The stability of the nuclear nonproliferation norm: a critique of norm-contestation theory

This article argues that the nuclear nonproliferation norm (NNPN) is a social fact with a relatively independent life of its own and that it has a powerful impact on the behavior of both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). It challenges the application of critical constructivist research on norms to the NNPN and the idea that its legitimacy and structural power depend on contestation “all the way down.” State and non-state actors play an important role in explaining the dynamics of the NNPN, but agential constructivism runs the danger of “throwing the baby out with the bath water,” neglecting the structural impact of the NNPN on state behavior. The article examines the limitations of norm-contestation theory, arguing that some norms are more resistant to contestation than others. The NNPN is more difficult to contest than new norms (such as the Responsibility to Protect) because it is rooted in fifty years of nonproliferation nuclear diplomacy. The US-India nuclear deal is not a case of “norm change” but a violation of the NNPN. The “core” of the NNPN has not changed since the US-India nuclear deal. The conflict confronting NWS and NNWS is about the implementation of “type 2” norms (organizing principles) and “type 3” norms (standardized procedures), and not about the “hard core” of the NNPN.     

Avoiding self-inflicted wounds to the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent

Nuclear deterrence requires not only the reliability of a state’s strategic weapons and the willingness of its leaders to employ them but also an adversary’s appreciation of these conditions. Weapons perceived as failing to hold their targets at risk may lack deterrent value, just as retaliatory threats that are not believable may fail to deter, even if a state’s operational capabilities are robust. Both the technical and political credibility of the US nuclear deterrent may have suffered self-inflicted harm since the end of the Cold War, often as casualties of intemperate policy debates. In particular, doubts have been sowed about the reliability of aging US warheads under a science-based stockpile-stewardship regime meant to substitute for nuclear-explosive testing. Likewise, the credibility of US deterrent threats may have waned as American leaders have spoken ever more stridently about the horrors of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, underscoring their extreme aversion to the risk of nuclear attack. Diminished credibility in both spheres threatens to compromise US national-security objectives ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to the outcomes of nuclear crises.     

一种防空导弹无线分布式信息共享系统

以PCI04嵌入式工控机为核心设计主控单元,以嵌入式单片机为核心设计从属单元,并应用GPS OEM接收板、AMAI)4550无线通信模块等,构建无线主从分布式信息共享系统.在该系统的支持下,大型防空导弹武器系统和若十便携式防空导弹间可以进行信息共享和交互,集成为一个以大型防空导弹武器系统为中心的防空作战体系,通过优势互补和邯同作战,能够实现作战效能的倍增.     

A model of supply-chain decisions for resource sharing with an application to ventilator allocation to combat COVID-19

We present a stochastic optimization model for allocating and sharing a critical resource in the case of a pandemic. The demand for different entities peaks at different times, and an initial inventory for a central agency are to be allocated. The entities (states) may share the critical resource with a different state under a risk-averse condition. The model is applied to study the allocation of ventilator inventory in the COVID-19 pandemic by FEMA to different U.S. states. Findings suggest that if less than 60% of the ventilator inventory is available for non-COVID-19 patients, FEMA's stockpile of 20 000 ventilators (as of March 23, 2020) would be nearly adequate to meet the projected needs in slightly above average demand scenarios. However, when more than 75% of the available ventilator inventory must be reserved for non-COVID-19 patients, various degrees of shortfall are expected. In a severe case, where the demand is concentrated in the top-most quartile of the forecast confidence interval and states are not willing to share their stockpile of ventilators, the total shortfall over the planning horizon (until May 31, 2020) is about 232 000 ventilator days, with a peak shortfall of 17 200 ventilators on April 19, 2020. Results are also reported for a worst-case where the demand is at the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval. An important finding of this study is that a central agency (FEMA) can act as a coordinator for sharing critical resources that are in short supply over time to add efficiency in the system. Moreover, through properly managing risk-aversion of different entities (states) additional efficiency can be gained. An additional implication is that ramping up production early in the planning cycle allows to reduce shortfall significantly. An optimal timing of this production ramp-up consideration can be based on a cost-benefit analysis.     

基于Multi-Agent的信息共享行为建模研究

针对信息共享行为的优化需求,构建了基于Multi-Agent的信息共享行为模型,该模型由Agent特性、Agent信念、Agent连通性和Agent行为4个模块组成。在Agent信念模块,提出了关于信念的信任值量化更新方法,将其作为信息共享行为交互的优先级排序的依据。规范了Agent发送信息、接收信息和处理信息的实验流程。通过仿真实验,得出了较为理想的信息共享行为组织模式,实现了信任阈值下的信息过滤,通过实验结果分析验证了信息共享行为模型的有效性。