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581.
水中兵器延寿样本的装载可靠度鉴定试验方案 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
针对延寿样本子样少,按经典GJB899法对装载可靠度鉴定需要较长的试验时间这一实际情况,提出了一种减少试验时间的Bayes方法.该方法通过挖掘延寿前装载失效率信息,确定先验分布,再开展陆上加速装载试验以增加装载信息,并结合实际装载信息制定了装载可靠度鉴定试验新方案.实例计算表明:在确保鉴定效果的前提下,新方法可在较小的延寿样本条件下快速完成装载可靠度鉴定工作,满足水中兵器延寿工程的实际需要. 相似文献
582.
船舶领域的FPGA软件测试严重滞后于应用增长的速度,部分型号甚至未将其纳入测试范畴。在研制过程中,由FPGA故障导致的修改调试已成为影响进度和增加成本的瓶颈。因此,针对FGPA软件特点及其测试的现状,对其测试过程、测试模型和过程管理进行研究,并给出完整的过程管理体系。通过采用规范化、有序化、系统化、面向工程的、面向任务的文档及配套管理手段进行正确引导、组织和实施测试活动,持续改进测试流程中各个阶段工作质量和效用,及早及时地发现和关闭开发过程中存在的缺陷,提高设计和测试的沟通效率,最终保证FPGA产品的质量,提升客户的满意度。 相似文献
583.
静电放电试验是安全性评价的一项重要内容.参照IEC 61000-4-2标准,提出弹药装备静电放电试验方法为间接静电放电和直接静电放电.该方法拓展应用标准的"开放等级",构建试验系统,并进行相应的试验研究,从而为新型弹药装备定型或静电安全性评价提供了全面评价方法. 相似文献
584.
月尘环境材料带电地面模拟试验系统研究 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
介绍月尘的特点及月尘静电对航天活动的危害,根据月尘环境下材料带电的原理,构建真空环境材料带电地面模拟试验系统.利用装置进行模拟静电月尘对探月航天器的作用,研究月尘静电对登月探测器的静电起电、吸附、耦合及放电效应影响规律,从而初步解决我国在探月工程上月球探测器对月球表面静电防护技术的需求. 相似文献
585.
为探究交流杂散电流的影响因素及其对阴极保护系统的影响,搭建交流干扰腐蚀实验平台研究了土壤电阻率、干扰电压大小、涂层电阻率和通断时间比对交流杂散电流密度的影响;采用腐蚀试片失重法研究了交流杂散电流密度对腐蚀速率的影响以及阴极保护电位分别为-850 mV和-1 000 mV时对阴极保护系统的影响。实验结果表明:土壤电阻率、干扰电压大小、涂层电阻率和通断时间比对交流杂散电流密度具有较为显著的影响;阴极保护电位为-1 000 mV时,即使交流电流密度为20 mA/cm2,腐蚀试片也能得到有效保护。因此,埋地管道应采用绝缘性能好的防腐涂层,规划合理的铺设路线,并在运行过程中采取强制电流阴极保护系统,设置合理的阴极保护电位。 相似文献
586.
Jeffrey W. Knopf 《Contemporary Security Policy》2017,38(1):26-34
Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal. 相似文献
587.
Ulrich Kühn 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(1-2):155-166
The end of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has the potential to plunge Europe and NATO into deep crisis. Russia’s continued violation coupled with the Donald J. Trump administration’s desire to balance against Moscow and Beijing could force a new missile debate on Europeans. Even though Washington is trying to assuage its allies, the specter of another round of INF missile deployments to Europe is not unrealistic. Meanwhile, NATO’s European members face a dilemma. Some want NATO to resolutely push back against Russia. Others want to avoid a new deployment debate, at almost all costs. The Kremlin will use these cleavages to weaken NATO. If not carefully handled, NATO’s response to the Russian missile buildup could lead to domestic turmoil in a number of European states and render the alliance ineffective for a prolonged period. Europeans need to act now and voice their preferences in the military and diplomatic domains. A number of different military options are available, below the level of deploying new INF missiles in Europe. However, Europeans need to consider trade-offs regarding crisis and arms-race stability. At the same time, it will be up to European capitals to conceptualize a new arms-control framework for the post-INF world, one that takes into account today’s geopolitical realities and the entanglement of modern conventional and nuclear forces. Given the Trump administration’s loathing of arms control, concepts of mutual restraint may well have to wait for the next US administration. In any case, that should not stop Europeans from taking on more responsibility for their own security. 相似文献
588.
Covell Meyskens 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):499-517
ABSTRACTThis article examines Chinese views of North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program during the Donald J. Trump administration. It shows that China has portrayed itself as a responsible country that promotes regional stability, unlike the United States, which has engaged in military brinkmanship with North Korea. Some Chinese foreign-policy experts have asserted that Beijing should back Pyongyang in the event of war because of their shared history of humiliation by great powers, while others have favored working with other regional partners. Another theme in Chinese discourse about North Korea is that Pyongyang is an impetuous, ungrateful regime that impedes Beijing’s ability to attain its core interests of regional stability, economic development, and heightened global influence. This negative assessment of North Korea drove Beijing’s endorsement of stricter UN sanctions in 2017. While Beijing has punished Pyongyang for its wayward policies, China responded favorably to North Korea’s decision in April 2018 to stop nuclear tests and partake in international dialogue. Beijing seeks to help Pyongyang gradually disarm and develop its economy within a Chinese-led East Asian order. The article concludes by explaining how Beijing’s recent, more positive view of Pyongyang is likely to affect its support for American efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program. 相似文献
589.
Avni Önder Hanedar Elmas Yaldız Hanedar Erdost Torun Hasan Murat Ertuğrul 《Defence and Peace Economics》2018,29(5):557-575
During the transformation period of the Ottoman Empire leading to the Republic of Turkey, many conflicts took place between 1918 and 1923. These conflicts interrupted the servicing of the Ottoman war bond. The reimbursement likelihood of this bond was related to the outcomes of First World War and the hostilities. This paper analyses the impacts of First World War and hostilities on the risk assessments regarding the Ottoman war debt, using manually collected data on the price of the Ottoman war bond traded at the ?stanbul bourse between 1918 and 1925. The empirical results imply that the defeat of the Bulgarian army and the peace offer of Austria-Hungary were associated with the increasing premium demanded by investors of the bond. The victories of the Turkish National Movement and the peace offer of the Allies to end the hostilities by 1922 positively affected the likelihood of the servicing of the debt. 相似文献
590.
Joshua Rovner 《战略研究杂志》2017,40(5):696-730
China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight. 相似文献