断裂复合材料层压板贴片快速修复工艺研究

采用CMR-1A复合材料热补仪和3234/G814复合材料预浸料贴片,对完全断裂的复合材料层压板进行双面修复。通过正交试验法获得了最佳修复工艺参数:固化温度为130℃;固化时间为80 min;贴片层数为5层(单面);真空度为0.04 MPa;贴片长度为50 mm。对优化工艺参数进行试验验证,结果表明:复合材料层压板拉伸强度从0 MPa增加到320.84 MPa,提高了57.29%;LY12CZ铝合金和45钢板拉伸强度恢复率分别为96%和75.53%。     

磁隐身坦克的实验设计及性能检测

通过模拟实验,研究了磁隐身坦克的核心元件——同轴密绕消磁线圈的使用性能。实验室对其消磁效应的数据分析表明:同轴密绕消磁线圈能够消除坦克周围因被地磁场磁化而产生的磁场标志,其中近轴区域的消磁效果更为明显;如果在消磁线圈中通入反向电流,消磁物体的磁场反而会增强,呈缓慢磁化的趋势,这与电磁场理论相符。本实验设计的消磁线圈属于一种新功能的电磁装甲,能提高坦克在电磁战中的生存能力。     

考虑细观结构变化的原状Q3黄土变形和强度特性

为研究结构性对非饱和原状Q3黄土变形和强度特性的影响,做了12个非饱和原状Q3黄土的CT-三轴侧向卸荷试验。在试验剪切过程中,利用CT机对试样进行跟踪扫描,共得到168张CT图像。基于试验数据建立了细观结构参数,并利用该参数来反映非饱和原状Q3黄土的变形和强度特性,从而得到能反映细观结构性影响的非线性应力-应变关系以及摩尔-库伦强度公式。     

通用装备机械液压系统综合检测试验平台运用问题研究

论述了通用装备机械液压系统综合检测试验平台的功能、组成结构、特点及对平台的初步认识,从使用时机、平台的编配、平台的质量管理、平台保障数据库建设、平台的应用等方面,对平台的运用问题进行了研究,并从平时保障的角度对平台提出改进建议。     

改进非凸估计与非对称时空正则化的红外小目标检测方法

针对复杂背景下的红外小目标检测,在非对称时空正则化约束的非凸张量低秩估计算法基础上,提出了一种新的核范数估计方法代替原算法中的估计方法。提出基于结构张量与多结构元顶帽(Top-Hat)滤波的自适应权重张量对目标张量进行约束,增强目标张量稀疏性的同时抑制其中残存的强边缘结构。实验结果表明,所提改进算法能够更好地消除图像中强边缘结构对检测结果的影响,在保证检测率的情况下,较原算法具有更低的虚警率。     

仿真在制导兵器试验与鉴定中的应用

制导兵器向信息化方向发展,对制导兵器试验与鉴定技术提出了新的要求.针对这些新要求,介绍了国外制导兵器仿真试验技术现状和方法,论述了仿真在制导兵器试验与鉴定中的作用,设计了制导兵器半实物仿真试验系统及其试验模式.得出结论认为,建立实际飞行试验与半实物仿真试验相结合的综合试验模式,是仿真技术在制导兵器试验与鉴定中应用的发展方向.     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.