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121.
Mwita Chacha 《African Security Review》2013,22(4):38-50
African states are hampered by unreliable electric energy that has not complemented economic development efforts. Recently, several African states announced plans to pursue nuclear energy in the future. However, several challenges remain for these states, notably insecurity and financial deficiencies. This paper proposes the use of regional integration arrangements to address these challenges faced by African states, as a way of complementing other efforts enabling African states to obtain nuclear energy. The existence of these arrangements and their institutional mechanisms can enable African states to enhance security and cost-effectively develop nuclear power infrastructure. 相似文献
122.
Egle Murauskaite 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):321-339
ABSTRACTThis article explores the paradox of trust in the largest nuclear smuggling operation involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) discussed in open source literature. In the first effort to understand the type, extent, and role of trust in nuclear smuggling enterprises, it draws from literature on trust development in legitimate businesses as well as criminal enterprises. Observed behavioral patterns in this case challenge traditional notions of the internal dynamics of temporary groups engaged in nuclear smuggling and operational realities of such activities. The article seeks to explain why individuals agree (and continue) to operate in this high-risk environment, unbound by close personal ties, without any effort to verify the background, motives, or qualifications of the fellow conspirators. It offers ways to advance current nonproliferation efforts in non-state actor interdiction by exploiting the environment of shallow trust in temporary groups. 相似文献
123.
Henry David Sokolski 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):499-504
ABSTRACTIn March 2015, the South Australian state government established a royal commission to investigate the financial, social, technical, diplomatic, and nonproliferation benefits and risks of expanding its nuclear industry, including activities related to uranium mining; enriching, reprocessing, and fabricating nuclear fuels for both domestic use and export; producing nuclear power; and storing radiological waste, including foreign spent reactor fuel. Given its enormous uranium reserves and current mining activities, some Australians have argued that Australia could benefit financially by expanding the mining sector and by adding value to its uranium exports by enriching the material and fabricating it into reactor fuel assemblies. Others have maintained that Australia can realize significant economic benefits by recycling and storing foreign spent fuel and producing carbon-free nuclear power. In the end, the commission recommended that Australia consider opening up a high-level waste repository to take in foreign spent fuel. It did not recommend any other nuclear activities at this time. The following viewpoint is based on testimony I delivered to the commission on the nuclear weapon proliferation implications of the proposed activities. If Australia wants to avoid the temptation of selling nuclear goods to states that might use these goods to make bombs, it should only consider new nuclear activities that can be entirely financed by the private sector and turn a profit without having to resort to foreign sales. This policy would also enable Australia to set an important, new international nonproliferation standard. 相似文献
124.
Matt Korda 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):263-284
ABSTRACTConventional theories of alliance management often overemphasize the utility of either assurance or coercion in preventing allied nuclear proliferation. Historical analysis reveals that prioritizing either of these two tactics to the exclusion of the other is inadvisable. A strategy that focuses solely on security guarantees or coercive threats is likely to encourage an allied state to pursue a hedging strategy, in which the client state continues to clandestinely develop its own nuclear capabilities while remaining underneath its patron’s defensive “umbrella.” This article introduces a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of nonproliferation-focused alliance-management strategies. By exploring the cases of West Germany and South Korea, the article concludes that the best way to prevent allies from pursuing nuclear weapons is to combine assurance with coercion. This establishes an incentive–punishment relationship that limits an ally’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons. These conclusions have particular salience today, as conversations over nuclear-weapons development have become increasingly normalized in Germany and particularly in South Korea. The United States’s capacity to influence its allies’ nuclear behavior is currently being eroded through the degradation of both patron credibility and client dependence, weakening the long-term viability of the global nonproliferation regime. 相似文献
125.
Daniel Khalessi 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):421-439
ABSTRACTSince the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today. 相似文献
126.
目标选择的一个优化模型 总被引：7，自引：3，他引：4
坦克作战过程中 ,经常出现一个坦克群遭遇对方一个坦克群的情况 ,这时每辆坦克往往向威胁自身最大的目标开火 ,但这种选择的整体效果不一定最优。本文提出一种目标选择方法 ,使得最大限度地减轻了对方对己方的威胁 ,大大提高了作战坦克对敌杀伤效果 相似文献
127.
《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2012,23(4-5):627-647
In recent years two theories have emerged in academia with regards to ‘small wars’: A ‘German way of war’ and a ‘British way of war’. The first one believes in a specific German military culture until 1945 accepting mass violence against civilians to quell any form of civil unrest. The second theory stresses a moderate British approach during the twentieth century; in defeating insurgencies the British Army had applied ‘minimum force’. This article challenges both views by looking into two largely forgotten counter-insurgency campaigns by the end of the First World War: The Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 and the British in Mesopotamia in 1920. It will be argued that one cannot speak in general terms about a ruthless German and a moderate British approach during this period – in fact it was quite the contrary in some ways. 相似文献
128.
Cian O’Driscoll 《战略研究杂志》2019,42(7):901-919
ABSTRACTThis article examines how scholars of the just war tradition think about the ethical dilemmas that arise in the endgame phase of modern warfare. In particular, it focuses upon their reticence to engage the idiom of ‘victory’. Why, it asks, have scholars been so reluctant to talk about what it means to ‘win’ a just war? It contends that, while just war scholars may have good reason to be sceptical about ‘victory’, engaging it would grant them a more direct view of the critical potentialities, but also the limitations, of just war reasoning. 相似文献
129.
Matthew P. Dearing 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):101-139
ABSTRACTThe American way of war in Afghanistan presents a conundrum for proponents of 21st-century state-building projects. How can liberal peace proponents engage in efficient state building without sacrificing their ideals? The US learned that state-building allocates a degree of command and control to powerbrokers operating in the shadows to launder aid money, traffic illicit narcotics, and engage in extrajudicial punishments. These clients failed to represent the liberal values foreign patrons endorsed, because the latter not only offered resources without conditions but also rewarded bad behavior. This issue is examined by looking at the case of post-2001 northern Afghanistan, where powerful warlords should have held greater control over their paramilitary forces, limited predatory behavior, and built stronger relationships with the community. Instead, warlords-turned-statesmen expanded their material and social influence in the north, while holding onto the informal instruments of racketeering and patronage that overwhelmed Western ideals and shaped the predatory state present in Afghanistan today. Moreover, paramilitaries were influenced by material, social, and normative incentives that rewarded violent and predatory behavior and further eroded already weak community control mechanisms at the subdistrict level. 相似文献
130.
Dallas Boyd 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(1-2):105-126
Nuclear deterrence requires not only the reliability of a state’s strategic weapons and the willingness of its leaders to employ them but also an adversary’s appreciation of these conditions. Weapons perceived as failing to hold their targets at risk may lack deterrent value, just as retaliatory threats that are not believable may fail to deter, even if a state’s operational capabilities are robust. Both the technical and political credibility of the US nuclear deterrent may have suffered self-inflicted harm since the end of the Cold War, often as casualties of intemperate policy debates. In particular, doubts have been sowed about the reliability of aging US warheads under a science-based stockpile-stewardship regime meant to substitute for nuclear-explosive testing. Likewise, the credibility of US deterrent threats may have waned as American leaders have spoken ever more stridently about the horrors of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, underscoring their extreme aversion to the risk of nuclear attack. Diminished credibility in both spheres threatens to compromise US national-security objectives ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to the outcomes of nuclear crises. 相似文献