Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

采取仿真模拟技术预设战争实现训练与实战接轨

文章研究信息化条件下局部战争战法。利用模拟作战实验室实践检验、论证完善战争设计理论,普及电脑游戏开发战争想象力,借虚拟数学方式预测战争结果。强化“战争设计”对训练的牵引作用,落实训战一致。强调加强军事理论研究的针对性、前瞻性．综合考虑武器装备、战争战例、军事训练水平、人员素质、战役战术等因素,对未来可能发生的战争进行准确预测。     

Nuclear security culture enhancement: the role of culture coordinators at Russian nuclear sites

In 2002, a Nuclear Security Culture (NSC) Enhancement Program with the mission to raise the level of the NSC at sites and facilities in Russia's nuclear complex was launched under the guidance of the Russian State Corporation “ROSATOM” and with support from the US Department of Energy. A Joint Working Group for NSC with both Russian Federation and US members was formed and charged with the design and implementation of the program. The program was implemented at sites and facilities on a pilot basis. Nine sites participated in the Pilot Project. The key program component was an establishment of Culture Coordinators (CCs) with the authority to coordinate and implement NSC enhancement activities at sites and facilities. The CCs have served as the force that has maintained the momentum of the Pilot Project and continuously steered the site NSC enhancement efforts. The contribution of the CCs in achieving the positive outcomes of the program cannot be overstated.     

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.     

核动力装置控制系统神经网络故障诊断

研究了如何将先进的人工神经网络的方法应用到核动力控制系统故障诊断中,并对这种方法的原理、优缺点、可行性等进行了分析,提出了针对核动力装置控制系统的设计方案.     

核电磁脉冲对单片机系统的辐照效应研究

核爆炸产生的电磁脉冲的“杀伤”范围极广,它可使距离爆心投影点几千公里的电气设备、电子装备和系统的工作失灵甚至破坏。为了研究它对单片机的各种效应,利用GTEM室产生的模拟核电磁脉冲,对单片机系统进行了辐照效应实验。实验表明,单片机系统在核电磁脉冲作用下,会出现“死机”、重启动、控制状态的改变、通讯错误和外部RAM内容改变以及数据采集误差增大等现象。在实验基础上,研究了单片机系统的各种效应产生的原因。     

基于构件的软件复用技术在防化软件中的应用

软件复用是在软件开发过程中避免重复劳动的解决方案。通过构件的形式来实现软件复用,可以提高开发的效率和质量。以核侦察处理模块的实现和集成为例,介绍了基于构件的复用技术在目前信息化建设中的使用手段和方法。     

Soldiering the terrain of war: Zimbabwean soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998–2002)

The paper reveals how Zimbabwean soldiers who fought in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998–2002) were challenged by the terrain of war. While soldiers are trained to live and fight in dreadful wars, I argue that immersing oneself in the war terrain is neither mathematical nor calculative; rather, war tactics to be employed are defined by the context in which soldiers operate in. When soldiers reflect on and about the war, they unconsciously produce accounts that are often not completely heroic, but a life lived in fear as well an issue that they had never anticipated when they set out to war. A main finding of this study is that while these soldiers were deployed to fight against the rebels, they find difficulties in locating physical features from map reading to the ground, distinguishing the enemy from civilian people and deployed for days without eating a proper meal as well as seeing their fellow soldiers dying in the context of war. The paper provides a vantage point in which we can also understand that trained soldiers do not exert total power over war terrains, they are sometimes challenged by the war situation itself.     

The Normative Implications of “Knowing the Future” for Preventive War

What if claims about the future informed us about the intentions and the capabilities of our opponents to wage war against ourselves? Would and should the existing norms that restrict the preventive use of force change in the wake of such transformation? This article highlights the potential normative consequences of this change and discriminates between several possible normative evolutions. Would and should the “knowability of the future” alter radically the traditional rule of self-defense? This rule could indeed be jeopardized but, as I argue in this paper, it should not (and might not necessarily). However, the distinction between preemption and prevention could become obsolete. Future claims about security will also induce new security doctrines as knowledge about the future would be used to signal one’s intentions and deter one’s opponent. This change would also have a significant impact on accountability, as citizens would have a more active role in discussions over foreign policy. Moreover, new modes of predictions and forecasting will challenge the traditional role of experts whose biases have hampered their analyses and anticipations. Thus, trustworthy future claims could bring significant progress in both ethical and political terms as they would trigger a debate on the role of knowledge in democratic societies.