PART III: CHALLENGING THE UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON DETERRENCE

In reply to Ward Wilson's response, the author notes that Wilson's current position about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is relatively agnostic compared to his original essay and that he now uses a much finer brush to define his qualms about nuclear deterrence. The perfectibility, rather than the existence of nuclear deterrence, is the paramount issue. The author also contends that in remaining fixated on civilian deaths and using Hiroshima and Nagasaki as his litmus test, Wilson fails to adequately consider whether there are other potential nuclear harms—fundamentally different in scale, scope, and moral and existential ramifications—that potentially can terrify societies enough to make nuclear deterrence a perfect or nearly perfect mode of security.     

TURKEY AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As many states in the Middle East are considering whether to embark on nuclear power programs, there is an urgent need to develop confidence-building measures to reassure states in the region that the programs are peaceful. One possible path would be to consider multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle in order to foster nuclear cooperation between states in the region, instead of each state going it alone, which would likely increase suspicions and the risk of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. With its policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” strategic connection to the West, and long-standing experience in the nuclear field, Turkey would be well-placed to take the lead on such a nuclear confidence-building agenda. Over time and under the right political conditions, Turkey could initiate or participate in measures including cooperation on nuclear education, safety and security, research and development, and joint fuel cycle facilities such as a regional fuel fabrication center.     

ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.     

INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS

Military interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons has grown in recent years as advances in science and technology have appeared to offer the promise of new “non-lethal” weapons useful for a variety of politically and militarily challenging situations. There is, in fact, a long and unfulfilled history of attempts to develop such weapons. It is clear that advances are opening up a range of possibilities for future biological and chemical weapons more generally. The treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons make no distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” weapons—all are equally prohibited. Indeed, a sharp and technically meaningful distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” biological and chemical weapons is beyond the capability of science to make. Thus, interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons, and efforts on the part of various states to develop them, pose a significant challenge to the treaty regimes, to the norms against biological and chemical warfare that they embody, and, ultimately, to the essential protections that they provide. Preventing a new generation of biological and chemical weapons from emerging will take concerted efforts and action at the local, national, and international levels.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

THE LAST TO DISARM?

France still sees its nuclear arsenal as essential both as insurance against future major risks and as support for an independent foreign policy. There is a wide consensus in the country to maintain a nuclear deterrent, both among political parties and the general public. A modernization program is under way that will ensure the continued efficacy of the French nuclear force well into the 2030s, and France has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of its disarmament commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This suggests that the likeliest future direction of France's nuclear policy is conservatism. However, other scenarios remain possible, especially in the domain of transatlantic and/or European cooperation.     

MAKING THE AGENDA STICK Lessons Learned From the 2007 NPT PrepCom

After the conclusion of the 2008 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Nonproliferation Review interviewed Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan, who presided over the 2007 session of the PrepCom in Vienna. He provided valuable insights into his preparations for the PrepCom and shared his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues that confronted his chairmanship and the PrepCom as a whole. The interview also provides useful perspectives on the future of the strengthened review process.     

ACHIEVING NUCLEAR BALANCE

One of the most important questions affecting U.S. national security is the future size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. While there is clear consensus within the U.S. government on the need to reduce the size of the arsenal, there is none on the best path to achieve these cuts; on the type of deterrent necessary to deal with future threats; or on the size of the production complex needed to support that arsenal. Creating a strategic commission to review these questions, as contemplated in the Fiscal 2008 House Defense Authorization bill, is a necessary first step to establish a sensible nuclear policy. The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which has the potential to transform the complex while preserving the current moratorium on nuclear testing, is a program worth exploring further if it stays within congressionally mandated bounds. As Congress considers both programmatic and policy matters related to U.S. nuclear weapons, it is vital that we also renew and strengthen U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation.     

POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen. Princeton University Press, 2007. 404 pages, $26.95.     

Technical and proliferation‐related aspects of the dismantlement of Russian Alfa‐Class nuclear submarines

When does a state become a “nuclear weapon state”? How we choose to answer this question has significant implications for proliferation assessment, analysis, and policy. Traditionally, the standard demarcation line has been a state's first nuclear test, but in recent years analysts have increasingly focused instead on the accumulation of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material. The article argues that although the test/no-test indicator clearly has problems, its replacement by the SQ/no-SQ indicator would be highly counterproductive. The article instead proposes supplementing the traditional test/no-test indicator with a theory-driven approach that focuses on the incentives and disincentives to test.