China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes

The biological and chemical weapon nonproliferation and disarmament regimes are often put forward as models of what the nuclear nonproliferation regime could (or should) be. But are these regimes effective? If so, is one stronger and/or more effective than the other? What is it that makes them relatively stronger than the nuclear nonproliferation regime? In this article, we return to and expand upon a framework for assessing regime health and effectiveness. We utilize this framework to engage in a comparative analysis of the chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) nonproliferation regimes, respectively. Our analysis reveals that these two regimes are comparatively healthier than their nuclear counterpart. While some of their behavioral features might be troubling—such as the disputes over stockpile destruction of CW—these tend to be mitigated by the presence of a strong norm against possession and proliferation of both CW and BW. This norm is adequately embedded into the existing institutional features of the regimes in ways that do not exist in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.     

A Proliferation of Royal Air Forces

Australia's interest in nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s is usually explained in terms of high politics and grand strategy. This proliferation case study explores, in greater detail than hitherto, the important part played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in pressing for a nuclear capability. It seeks to understand the reasons behind the RAAF's lobbying, in particular its previous experience with air power, its visceral desire for advanced manned bomber aircraft, and its strong institutional link to the British Royal Air Force. The decision in 1963 to acquire the supersonic US F-111 strike aircraft, instead of rivals including the British TSR.2, is also considered. Once the RAAF's bomber ambitions were satisfied, interest in nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Finally, some comments are included on the nuclear interests of other air forces in the British Commonwealth.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

大型复杂武器装备质量综合评价及其支持系统设计

从大型复杂武器装备系统的具体特点出发,运用基于TOPSIS主成分价值函数模型的主成分分析法（PCA）,构建了大型复杂武器装备质量综合评估模型。进行了实证分析,结果表明,该方法的应用使前三个主成分综合携带了原系统全部信息的96.04%,避免了信息的重叠和交叉,也克服了主观因素对评价的影响,更客观全面地反映了设备的质量状况。最后通过对其支持系统的设计,实现对企业与部队不同质量管理决策层的信息支持。     

基于二人有限零和对策的防空兵火力分配方法

为了优化防空作战过程中火力分配问题,使射击达到最佳效果,运用对策论、线性规划等理论方法,采用对策矩阵建立了防空火力分配的线性规划模型,并通过计算示例和计算机仿真初步预测了敌方的空袭兵器使用情况和我方相应的兵力分配对策。该模型建立的防空火力分配方法较好地满足了要地防空装备的战术应用问题,对提高作战效能具有一定的参考价值。     

光电型舰炮武器系统模拟训练仪的设计

为解决舰炮武器系统日常训练与检测问题,设计了舰炮武器系统模拟训练仪。介绍了模拟训练仪的组成、工作原理,及硬件、软件技术设计。其主要技术的应用涉及电视视频图象模拟技术、外弹道仿真及水柱坐标处理技术、距离方位法校射模拟技术及计算处理实时性技术。通过试验验证,该模拟训练仪能够很好的用于武器系统的检测和舰员的日常训练。