THE ORIGINS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

This article explores Russia's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons from three perspectives. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the phenomenon is not exclusively limited to Russia and represents a broader trend, which is ultimately rooted in the nature of the contemporary international system or, more precisely, the uncertainties of the transitional period between the Cold War system and a new emerging one. Second, it analyzes the role assigned to nuclear weapons in Russia's doctrinal documents, in particular the emergence of a new mission—limited-use of nuclear weapons to deter or, if deterrence fails, to de-escalate large-scale conventional conflicts. Discussions of the new doctrine, which have begun recently, suggest that this new mission will likely remain unchanged. Finally, this article looks at the apparent discrepancy between Russia's nuclear modernization programs and the roles assigned to nuclear weapons in the military doctrine, as well as the causes of that discrepancy.     

One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

ALBANIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON

In 2003, the Albanian government declared that in late 2002 it had discovered a heretofore unknown cache of 16 tons of chemical weapons. Tirana requested and received assistance from the West in securing and destroying the materials, a task completed in 2007. Albania has been lauded for its responsible handling of the discovery and for being the first nation to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This article argues that the Albanian government has always knowingly possessed the weapons, keeping them a secret until a post-September 11, 2001 international focus on weapons of mass destruction made it politically worthwhile for Tirana to declare and destroy them. The likelihood that the governments of the West turned a willful blind eye to this chain of events is troubling for the credibility of the CWC and confidence in nonproliferation measures in general. Finally, the author recommends measures to avoid and address similar situations in the future.     

SYMBIOTIC SPIES

Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, by Michael S. Goodman. Stanford University Press, 2007. 295 pages, $50.     

CALLING FOR ACTION

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are under more stress today than at any time in their history. Compliance concerns, a shortage of resources and technology, and growing responsibilities threaten to undermine the effectiveness and credibility of this vital and fundamental pillar of the nonproliferation regime. To address this challenge, the United States recently launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. The goal of this initiative is to ensure the IAEA makes the fullest possible use of its existing authority to prevent the diversion of safeguarded material and to investigate suspicious activities. The initiative will advance state-of-the-art technology, foster the development of a new generation of safeguards experts, and promote technology collaborations and safeguards-conscious infrastructure in states using or pursuing nuclear power. Although it has a domestic focus, the initiative's intent is to catalyze a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with other governments and the IAEA.     

I DESIRE,THEREFORE I PROLIFERATE

It is rare to find a well-formulated study that describes the behavioral aspects of leadership in the political realm. Even more infrequent is a combined study of individual behaviors as it applies to a large techno-political issue such as nuclear proliferation. India, Argentina, Australia, and France are used as cases for application of a national identity conception model. The model is based on two dimensions, solidarity and status, that when combined, result in a leader's identification with other nations’ abilities to be a player in the nuclear arms community. While the work is behavioral in context, there is no effort to avoid the technological side of proliferation, so as to provide a balanced review of a complex issue.     

VERIFIABILITY,RELIABILITY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate in October 1999 could have been avoided, and the consequences of that vote still loom in the minds of supporters of the treaty. President Barack Obama has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and a key element of the Obama administration's arms control agenda is delivering on U.S. CTBT ratification. In order to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty, senators that remain skeptical of nuclear disarmament must also be convinced that the entry into force of the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States. This article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. CTBT ratification divided into three segments—verifiability of the treaty, reliability of the U.S. stockpile, and the treaty's impact on U.S. national security—and concludes that CTBT ratification serves the security objectives of the United States. The CTBT constitutes an integral component of the multilateral nonproliferation architecture designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it constrains the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby hindering efforts by states of concern to develop advanced nuclear weapons.     

THE FRAGILE TRADITION OF NUCLEAR RESTRAINT

The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons by T.V. Paul. Stanford University Press, 2009. 319 pages, $29.95.     

论动物用于生物武器的新角色

文章通过对动物生物武器概念、特点的介绍,分析了利用基因技术改造动物源病原体,甚至动物本身作为生物武器的方式,提出了我国防御动物为主体的生物恐怖的建议.     

多目标多决策者环境下防空反导装备体系资源分配与优化

作战体系具有层次高、规模大,各作战分系统间协调配合密切的特征。在作战任务中,这种多层次、多系统、多决策者、多目标的结构使得对各作战子系统的武器装备分配变得更为复杂。为解决此类复杂结构的优化问题,在层次化多目标分析方法基础之上,将层次系统的风险管理引入到模型中来,形成多目标多决策者资源分配模型多目标多决策者资源分配模型,用以解决在不确定风险环境下进行多目标资源分配的问题。利用MOMDRA模型建模空袭风险下防空反导体系的武器装备分配问题,在求解该模型的过程中采用系统分解的思路,利用权重法,站在不同决策者的角度得到该体系的Pareto最优资源分配方案,并通过一个实例来说明此方法的可行性。