论动物用于生物武器的新角色

文章通过对动物生物武器概念、特点的介绍,分析了利用基因技术改造动物源病原体,甚至动物本身作为生物武器的方式,提出了我国防御动物为主体的生物恐怖的建议.     

多目标多决策者环境下防空反导装备体系资源分配与优化

作战体系具有层次高、规模大,各作战分系统间协调配合密切的特征。在作战任务中,这种多层次、多系统、多决策者、多目标的结构使得对各作战子系统的武器装备分配变得更为复杂。为解决此类复杂结构的优化问题,在层次化多目标分析方法基础之上,将层次系统的风险管理引入到模型中来,形成多目标多决策者资源分配模型多目标多决策者资源分配模型,用以解决在不确定风险环境下进行多目标资源分配的问题。利用MOMDRA模型建模空袭风险下防空反导体系的武器装备分配问题,在求解该模型的过程中采用系统分解的思路,利用权重法,站在不同决策者的角度得到该体系的Pareto最优资源分配方案,并通过一个实例来说明此方法的可行性。     

基于Elman神经网络的NSG水位特性辨识方法研究

针对核动力蒸汽发生器在瞬态、启动和低功率下的“收缩”与“膨胀”现象引起的逆动力学效应使核动力蒸汽发生器水位特性难以辨识的问题,提出了基于Elman神经网络的NSG水位特性辨识的新方法.采用串-并联型辨识结构,以保证辨识的收敛性和稳定性.网络训练采用Levenberg-Marququardt BP学习算法.仿真结果表明,所提出的方法能够正确地辨识核动力蒸汽发生器的水位特性,且具有较高的辨识精度.     

计算jn 组态总角动量J 允许值的递推方法

计算j~n组态总角动量J的允许值通常采用列举法,对j,n大的组态计算十分繁琐。本文提出计算j~n组态J的允许值的递推方法,使计算大为简化。在VAX-11/730机上完成J=1/2～15/2分类的CPU时间,用本文方法为3秒,用列举法[1]为1分50秒。列出了j=1/2～15/2分类结果,并发现文献[2]表6有三处差错。     

潜艇核事故应急评价模式研究

评价模式是核事故应急评价系统的核心．在理论分析的基础上,建立了适合基地特点的潜艇核事故应急评价模式及参数,并通过假想事故对所建立的评价模式进行了校核．结果表明,该模式具有良好的可靠性和可行性,适合基地的特点,满足核潜艇核事故应急评价的要求．根据所建模式,还编制了一套实用、可靠、灵活、方便的应用软件．     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.     

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.     

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.     

临近空间武器对预警探测制导技术的挑战

临近空间进攻武器具有速度快、射程远、机动性强的特点,对未来空天安全构成重大威胁.简要综述了国内外临近空间武器的发展现状、主要特点及特性,包括高超声速巡航导弹和高速滑翔弹头两大主要威胁,从预警探测和探测制导的角度,指出了预警探测制导技术在应对临近空间进攻武器上面临的严峻挑战,提出了对其关键技术和技术途径的几点思考.