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291.
Dalia Dassa Kaye 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):413-428
This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process. 相似文献
292.
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):551-567
This article examines the positions held by Brazil under the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–present) on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes and on contentious issues in those areas. Under Lula's government, Brazil has wanted to mediate between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to consolidate its position as a strong negotiator and to benefit from the possible gains of this position in terms of greater participation in international institutions. It has also wanted to pressure nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations in order to reduce asymmetries in its relations with powerful nuclear weapon countries. At the same time, Brazil has tried to preserve its autonomy and flexibility to protect commercial secrets and preserve national security in relation to its own nuclear program. 相似文献
293.
Siegfried S. Hecker 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):445-455
North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang. 相似文献
294.
Torrey Froscher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):419-424
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. Stanford University Press, 2009. 300 pages, $35. 相似文献
295.
Michael D. Cohen 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):433-435
Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities. 相似文献
296.
Dennis M. Gormley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):123-139
ABSTRACTThe dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. 相似文献
297.
Lauren Sukin 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):379-400
ABSTRACTSeveral states in the Middle East have noted their interest in nuclear energy programs, but current cost and timeline estimates understate the difficulties that these states will face. A state-level analysis of nuclear development capacities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates suggests that building nuclear infrastructure in the region will, in fact, be a lengthy and expensive endeavor, due to concerns such as export constraints, public opposition, a lack of human resources, and high overhead costs. This has implications for nuclear weapon nonproliferation: first, fears that these developing nuclear energy capabilities may facilitate possible weapon proliferation are premature, and second, there is time to ensure that any burgeoning nuclear infrastructure in the region remains safe and civilian in nature. 相似文献
298.
299.
David O. Smith 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):99-105
ABSTRACTIn No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration. 相似文献
300.
ABSTRACTThe threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction remains a daunting concern. Governments have undertaken several initiatives at the national and international level to prevent such illicit use, yet challenges remain. Notable is the absence of a single collaborative international forum of experts dedicated solely to bioterrorism prevention. The establishment of a Bioterrorism Prevention Initiative could be a possible solution to address this gap. This article explores possibilities for such an initiative and the ways in which it could strengthen the existing bio-nonproliferation regime. 相似文献