Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

Special Section: Nuclear Stability In South Asia

The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.     

French Nuclear Diplomacy

“French nuclear diplomacy” is the French government's use of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) to advance specific commercial and strategic interests. During the heart of the so-called nuclear renaissance, the Élysée Palace aggressively peddled France's nuclear expertise and technology abroad, signing over a dozen new NCAs in an effort to bring in business for the French industry, forge diplomatic relationships, and promote global nonproliferation norms. Several years later, however, the outcomes of France's aggressive global nuclear power push appear nominal at best. This article explores the mixed results of this nuclear campaign, and through three case studies, illustrates how many of France's commercial and political disappointments stem from unrealistic expectations and the disorganization of the French nuclear complex.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity

Due to expanding and increasing religious extremism and terrorism coupled with political instability in Pakistan, most western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and could be taken over by terrorists. This would have adverse implications for the region and for global peace, especially for the security of USA and Europe. This article argues that this perception is based on a flawed understanding and knowledge of how Pakistan's command and control setup has evolved and operates. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe as any other state's nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also been active in supporting and participating in global efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. Over the years, Pakistan has been quite open in sharing information regarding how it is improving its command and control system with western governments as well as scholars. This article argues that the steps Pakistan has taken to secure its nuclear weapons are adequate and that Pakistan would continue to further strengthen these measures; however, it is the expanding religious extremism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the country which make the international perception of Pakistan extremely negative and then seep into the perception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security.     

谈侦检车在处置核泄漏灾害事故中的应用

因海啸而引起的日本福岛核电站核泄漏危机,充分警示人类必须做好有效应对核泄漏事故的准备工作。核生化侦检车具有快速标定核辐射物质、确定辐射边界的功能,消防部队应研究、掌握和应用核生化侦检技术,积极做好应对今后有可能发生的核生化灾害事故的准备工作。     

基于遗传算法的装备使用保障费用灰色组合预测

针对目前对武器装备寿命周期费用估算建模难以实施的情况,以准确预测武器装备寿命周期费用的主要组成部分—装备使用保障费用为出发点,依据装备使用保障费用的特点建立了装备使用保障费用的灰色组合预测模型,指出了用蚁群算法优化组合权系数的不足,并提出了新的优化方法—遗传算法。最后,结合实例验证说明了该模型的预测效果优于蚁群优化的方法,为准确估算武器装备寿命周期费用提供了依据。     

用三维非线性Langevin方程计算裂变碎片质量分布

采用扩散模型,利用｛ｃ,ｈ,ａ｝三参数描述核形状,建立了三维非线性Ｌａｎｇｅｖｉｎ方程。用Ｍ—Ｃ方法模拟了核的形变运动,计算了处于高激发态的~（１９８）Ｈｇ,~（２１０）Ｐｏ和~（１８５）Ｒｅ核的裂变碎片质量分布。给出了裂变碎片的平均质量、均方差及最可几值等物理量。计算结果与实验值定性一致。     

两栖战斗车辆武器稳定系统海上适应性研究

分析了两栖战斗车辆武器稳定系统在海上浮渡时的工作特点。提出了提高系统海上适应性的方法,以提高武器系统的海上作战能力。