Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity

Due to expanding and increasing religious extremism and terrorism coupled with political instability in Pakistan, most western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and could be taken over by terrorists. This would have adverse implications for the region and for global peace, especially for the security of USA and Europe. This article argues that this perception is based on a flawed understanding and knowledge of how Pakistan's command and control setup has evolved and operates. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe as any other state's nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also been active in supporting and participating in global efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. Over the years, Pakistan has been quite open in sharing information regarding how it is improving its command and control system with western governments as well as scholars. This article argues that the steps Pakistan has taken to secure its nuclear weapons are adequate and that Pakistan would continue to further strengthen these measures; however, it is the expanding religious extremism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the country which make the international perception of Pakistan extremely negative and then seep into the perception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security.     

谈侦检车在处置核泄漏灾害事故中的应用

因海啸而引起的日本福岛核电站核泄漏危机,充分警示人类必须做好有效应对核泄漏事故的准备工作。核生化侦检车具有快速标定核辐射物质、确定辐射边界的功能,消防部队应研究、掌握和应用核生化侦检技术,积极做好应对今后有可能发生的核生化灾害事故的准备工作。     

基于遗传算法的装备使用保障费用灰色组合预测

针对目前对武器装备寿命周期费用估算建模难以实施的情况,以准确预测武器装备寿命周期费用的主要组成部分—装备使用保障费用为出发点,依据装备使用保障费用的特点建立了装备使用保障费用的灰色组合预测模型,指出了用蚁群算法优化组合权系数的不足,并提出了新的优化方法—遗传算法。最后,结合实例验证说明了该模型的预测效果优于蚁群优化的方法,为准确估算武器装备寿命周期费用提供了依据。     

基于Mamdani模糊推理的核动力装置技术状态评估

分析了传统二元逻辑应用于核动力装置部分失效技术状态评估时的局限性,概述了Mamdani模糊推理的基本技术;结合状态评估实例,提出了基于Mamdani模糊推理的核动力装置系统级的技术状态评估方法,为系统部分失效的技术状态评估提供了一种新的技术途径。     

《禁止化学武器公约》生效十年履约评述

简要回顾了《禁止化学武器公约》生效10年来化学武器的宣布、销毁、核查等履约进展情况。分析了履行《禁止化学武器公约》需要注意的几个问题,包括公约的普遍性、化学武器威胁的长时间存在,以及科学技术发展对《禁止化学武器公约》的影响等。     

改进非凸估计与非对称时空正则化的红外小目标检测方法

针对复杂背景下的红外小目标检测,在非对称时空正则化约束的非凸张量低秩估计算法基础上,提出了一种新的核范数估计方法代替原算法中的估计方法。提出基于结构张量与多结构元顶帽(Top-Hat)滤波的自适应权重张量对目标张量进行约束,增强目标张量稀疏性的同时抑制其中残存的强边缘结构。实验结果表明,所提改进算法能够更好地消除图像中强边缘结构对检测结果的影响,在保证检测率的情况下,较原算法具有更低的虚警率。     

基于RMS特性的武器装备的系统效能评估模型

为了保证武器装备的战斗力,建立了基于可靠性、维修性和保障性(RMS)的系统效能评估模型。定义系统效能的度量,分析其影响因素。针对执行任务期间装备发生故障时难修复和可修复两种情况,通过模型可用性、可信度及能力矩阵,分别求出基于RMS特性的武器装备系统效能表达式(ERMS),从而得出相应评估模型。     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.