An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

ARMY RE‐ENLISTMENT DURING OIF/OEF: BONUSES,DEPLOYMENT, AND STOP‐LOSS

In 2004, stretched by wartime deployments, the US Army countered declining retention by increasing re‐enlistment bonuses and implementing stop‐loss to prevent soldiers from separating at the end of their enlistment. We estimate the effects of bonuses, deployment, and stop‐loss on re‐enlistment between FY 2002 and 2006. We estimate that the baseline propensity to re‐enlist fell by 20%. However, we find that deployed soldiers are more likely to re‐enlist and that the estimated effects of re‐enlistment bonuses are similar to those estimated in peacetime. We evaluate the reasons for our findings, and calculate the cost effectiveness of re‐enlistment bonuses.     

AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES,UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENT DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FOR THE BASQUE COUNTRY

The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps is a high school program that combines classroom teaching with extracurricular activities. The program is located primarily in inner city schools and serves at‐risk students. Its goals are multidimensional and include military preparation and improving academic achievement. Using High School and Beyond data we find that the program’s effects depend on the timing and intensity of involvement. Test scores, graduation rates, and enlistments are higher for students who participate early in high school and for those who persist in the program. Conversely, we find few effects for students participating in the last two years of high school.     

Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq

Economic reconstruction typically takes place after the end of war. Yet recently, economic reconstruction has been viewed as a means to ‘win hearts and minds’ during ongoing conflict. Drawing on a variety of reconstruction experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify four ‘reconstruction traps’ that result from the incentives and constraints faced by actors involved in economic reconstruction during ongoing conflict. These traps include: 1. the credible commitment trap, 2. the knowledge trap, 3. the political economy trap, and 4. the bureaucracy trap. Avoiding these traps is critical for successful economic reconstruction; and we discuss potential strategies for doing so.     

Military expenditure and employment in South Africa*

Previous research into the impact of military expenditure on employment finds considerable variation across countries. This paper adds to the debate by examining the long run relationship between military burden and manufacturing employment in South Africa. Such an analysis provides an opportunity to test for crowding‐out effects and the impact of the marked decline in military spending on the South African economy. The paper finds evidence supporting the view that military expenditure will have a detrimental impact on long term manufacturing employment, adversely affecting industrial structure and efficiency.     

Operations sequencing for a multi‐stage production inventory system

This article studies operations sequencing for a multi‐stage production inventory system with lead times under predictable (deterministic) yield losses and random demand. We consider various cases with either full or partial release of work‐in‐process inventories, for either pre‐operation or post‐operation cost structures, and under either the total discounted or average cost criteria. We derive necessary and sufficient criteria for the optimal sequence of operations in all cases. While the criteria differ in their specific forms, they all lead to the same principal: those operations with (1) lower yields, (2) lower processing costs, (3) longer lead times, and (4) lower inventory holding costs should be placed higher upstream in the system.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 144–154, 2014     

Improved bounds for batch scheduling with nonidentical job sizes

Here, we revisit the bounded batch scheduling problem with nonidentical job sizes on single and parallel identical machines, with the objective of minimizing the makespan. For the single machine case, we present an algorithm which calls an online algorithm (chosen arbitrarily) for the one‐dimensional bin‐packing problem as a sub‐procedure, and prove that its worst‐case ratio is the same as the absolute performance ratio of . Hence, there exists an algorithm with worst‐case ratio , which is better than any known upper bound on this problem. For the parallel machines case, we prove that there does not exist any polynomial‐time algorithm with worst‐case ratio smaller than 2 unless P = NP, even if all jobs have unit processing time. Then we present an algorithm with worst‐case ratio arbitrarily close to 2. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 351–358, 2014