一种内陆环境溢油综合监测系统方案设计

针对内陆环境油品储存和运输场所面积大、植被多、地形多变、单一技术难以实现全范围溢油监测的情况,将复杂内陆环境下的油品储运区分为作业区、周围山地和水域3个主体区域,设计了一种基于无线通信的溢油综合监测系统方案。系统由综合监测报警中心和可燃气体、土壤溢油、水面浮油3个探测报警模块通过无线连接组成,各模块均包括若干相应的探测器和现场报警控制器,可对油品作业区及周围山地、水域进行全范围实时监测,及时报警泄漏溢油隐患,降低泄漏溢油事故发生几率。     

管道机器人在三通处的通过性分析

三通是管道机器人经常遇到的典型障碍之一,克服该障碍的能力用管道机器人在三通处通过性来描述。文中提出一种描述差压驱动式管道机器人三通通过性的数学模型,该模型由一组组合约束构成。通过对约束方程的分析讨论、与管道机器人弯道通过性的对比分析,得出了规律性的结论。管道机器人在三通处的姿态、单元体的几何尺寸、行走轮结构形式对其通过性都有不同程度的影响。所提出数学模型是管道机器人三通自主行走控制策略设计和相应结构设计的理论基础。     

影响油罐电位的输油参数分析

目前,油库、储运公司改扩建工程较多,不可避免对工艺流程进行调整,依据液体静电产生原理,应用高斯定理和欧姆定律等理论,分析油罐注油过程中油面电位以及时间与管径、流速等各参数之间的关系,针对管径不变流速变化的情况,进行实验分析,在不对管路进行整改,仅对泵进行重新设计优选时,对如何控制罐内电位的安全,提出参考方案,对油库改扩建工程有一定的指导意义。     

联合战役油料输送系统模拟模型及优化研究

油料输送是联合战役油料保障中的重要环节,其本质是一个受多种随机因素影响的复杂过程。以运筹学的排队论为建模指导思想,将联合战役油料输送视为一个由多个子系统组成的排队系统,在这一系统中有活动实体(油料)在其中流动。对此动态过程进行模拟分析,结合优化技术,定量分析各种输送方案的军事经济效益,为组织计划联合战役油料输送提供有效的决策支持。     

油料装备信息化的接入模式分析

给出了油料装备信息化中几种常见的信息接入方式:嵌入式系统、条码、射频标签,并对其进行了分析和比较。通过比较,认为嵌入式系统方式、射频标签方式具有较好的环境适应性、保密性和信息可读写性,大型油料装备的信息接入可采用这两种方式;二维条码因成本较低、具有一定的信息容量,可作为油料化验箱等小型装备器材的信息接入方式。最后对被覆线、卫星和短波电台3种信息传输方式的性能进行了比较。     

Military Off the Shelf Procurements: A Norwegian Case Study

Buying off the shelf procurements (OTS) has become an important part of the national acquisition strategy in several countries, and this paper seeks to bring empirical evidence on OTS as the preferred acquisition strategy by use of data from 2015 to 2022 investment portfolio of the Norwegian Armed Forces. We develop definitions for three categories of procurement – OTS, modified OTS and development projects – as well as a method to classify projects into these categories. Our first finding is that the characteristics of OTS projects correspond to modified OTS and development projects. Our second finding indicates that OTS projects perform better when it comes to the completion of projects according to the initial schedule, compared to development projects.     

Regular and irregular forces in conflict: nineteenth century insurgencies in South America

ABSTRACT

In the decades following independence from Spain, ‘civil wars’ ravaged the newly established polities in South America. Former vice-regal capitals inherited a larger portion of the colonial administration and had larger economic resources and a hegemonic project they were able to have permanent and professional armed forces, capable of leading the offensive and giving battle following the European rules of military art. The central hypothesis of this work is that there is a necessary relationship between the shape of these asymmetrical conflicts, their outcome and the political territorial configuration of each country in post-revolutionary Spanish America. When permanent armies took over from local militias, the capital kept the integrity of its territories and there was a tendency towards political centralization. When this did not happen and the militias managed to find a way to defeat their centralizing enemies, the local powers had an opportunity to renegotiate their participation in the political body, and sought to maintain their independence, which was manifest in federal agreements, otherwise a process of territorial fragmentation began. More than a difference between regular and irregular forces there was one between intermittent, and permanent mobilization.     

Casualty Rates of US Military Personnel During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Abstract

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended in August 2010, nearly 3500 hostile deaths occurred among US military personnel and 32,000 more were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in and around Afghanistan) through 2014 and about 20,000 were WIA. A larger proportion of wounded personnel survived in Iraq and Afghanistan than during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates were not as high as some studies have asserted. The survival rates were 90.2% in Iraq and 91.6% in Afghanistan, compared with 86.5% in Vietnam. The casualty rates varied between the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and before, during, and after the respective surges. Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6% of all WIA and 9.0% of medically evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb. Elevated non-hostile death rates (including deaths due to accidents, illnesses, homicides, or suicides) resulted in about 220 more deaths in Iraq and about 200 more deaths in Afghanistan than would have been expected in peacetime among populations of the size deployed to those two conflicts.     

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.