What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).     

NATO and the broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The history and lessons of controversial encounters

The engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East dates back to the founding of the Alliance. With one eye on this history and one eye on current controversies, this article investigates the preconditions for and nature of the allies' engagement in the region in order to assess whether the Middle East today is causing a rupture within the Alliance. The article finds that the Alliance was never likely to engage as one in the region. The Alliance instead guarded its cohesion by either letting the Alliance leader, the United States, take a lead role or by acting as a coalition enabling framework. This latter option has prevailed since the early 1980s. Today, NATO can preserve its cohesion and simultaneously engage in the region if it continues this legacy of coalition-making from within the allied framework. Conversely, an effort to engage collectively in the region will likely set of internal tensions to the extent that the Alliance itself will be at risk.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

内编队地球重力场测量性能数值分析

内编队系统通过实现内卫星纯引力轨道环境和内卫星精密定轨,完成高精度地球重力场测量,实现了不依赖于加速度计的重力卫星实施新途径。针对内编队重力场测量性能难以解析分析的情况,基于MATLAB并行程序设计进行了重力场测量数值模拟,获得了内编队重力场测量的有效阶数及其精度。在内编队轨道高度为300km、内卫星干扰力为1.0×10-10m/s2、外卫星定轨精度为3cm、内外卫星相对状态测量精度为1mm的条件下,计算得到内编队测量重力场的有效阶数为72,相应的大地水准面累积误差为44cm,重力异常累积误差为4.5mGal,由此可知内编队测量重力场的有效阶数主要分布在低阶部分。     

基于结构加权的海面编队预定目标选择方法

海面目标运动和编队阵型的约束特性,使得通过对装订阵型和末制导探测阵型进行点集匹配来选择预定目标成为一种有效途径。但当编队目标释放干扰时,会引起阵型结构发生局部变化,导致目标选择性能恶化。本文基于反舰导弹目标选择需求,分析了传感器导航和探测误差、装订信息误差、编队目标运动和释放干扰等因素所引起的位置点集变形,通过利用阵型中未污染的结构信息,提出了基于几何散列法和结构加权平均Hausdorff距离的编队预定目标选择方法。理论分析和实验结果表明,该方法不受传感器导航误差和编队目标整体运动的影响,在编队存在冲淡干扰时能有效提高目标选择能力。     

失去润滑条件下弧齿锥齿轮传动系统瞬态温度场Simulink仿真分析

根据传热学理论和热网络法,以某型直升机尾减速器弧齿锥齿轮传动系统为研究对象,建立了其温度场Simulink仿真计算模型。基于该模型,计算获得该传动系统正常润滑条件下的稳态温度场,并以它作为初始条件计算分析该传动系统失去润滑条件下的瞬态温度场,为预测该弧齿锥齿轮传动系统在失去润滑条件下的干运转生存能力提供理论依据。     

航空导航技术的发展方向

针对航空导航的特点,对现有航空导航装备的特点进行了分析,并结合未来作战的需求,给出了航空导航技术的发展方向,主要是组合式导航体制,将卫星导航与惯导的组合进一步与地形辅助导航、地球物理导航、地磁导航等方式结合起来.     

Component importance for linear consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n and m ‐Consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n systems with exchangeable components

Measuring the relative importance of components in a mechanical system is useful for various purposes. In this article, we study Birnbaum and Barlow‐Proschan importance measures for two frequently studied system designs: linear consecutive k ‐out‐of‐ n and m ‐consecutive‐ k ‐out‐of‐ n systems. We obtain explicit expressions for the component importance measures for systems consisting of exchangeable components. We illustrate the results for a system whose components have a Lomax type lifetime distribution. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013