Don't stop with Joint Forces Command … cut AFRICOM too

Abstract

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been a military success but a strategic messaging failure. The United States’ relationships across Africa cannot be boiled down to military affairs. This paper argues that Africa has many more opportunities than challenges and thus requires a more balanced foreign policy solution from Washington DC than a new military command. For the military engagement that does need to take place, a more low-profile approach would benefit the United States in Africa.     

拱顶罐量油孔油气逸出及扩散数值模拟

为了模拟拱顶罐量油孔油气逸出及逸出后的扩散过程,基于k-ε湍流理论建立了拱顶罐量油孔油气逸出扩散控制方程组,采用数值模拟方法重点讨论了不同罐内压力条件下油气逸出速度和量油孔附近油气浓度的变化.模拟结果表明罐内压力随时间变化与已有理论推导结果吻合;由于罐内正压,油气逸出速度很大,并且均在1 s左右达到峰值;在距离量油孔孔口2 m范围内,油气浓度偏高,无论是从安全、环保还是从人员健康方面考虑,都应采取措施降低油气浓度.     

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.     

不同黏度等级润滑油在柴油发动机上的对比试验

为解决润滑油出现的高温性能差等问题,考察5W/40和15W/40两个黏度等级重负荷动力传动通用润滑油在柴油发动机上的实际使用性能。在BF6M1015CP柴油发动机和柴油车辆上分别进行1 000 h发动机台架可靠性试验和高原实际道路行车试验,利用红外光谱等仪器对定期抽取的油样进行理化性能指标测试。结果表明：两个黏度等级的重负荷动力传动通用润滑油各项理化指标变化较小,均能满足高原地区大功率、重负荷柴油发动机的用油要求。使用两个黏度等级润滑油的发动机在功率和扭矩方面大小相当,使用5W/40重负荷动力传动通用润滑油的发动机在高转速区（转速高于1 600 r/min）油耗率低,在低转速区（转速低于1 600 r/min）油耗率较高;但在抗氧抗腐性、高温清净性和抗磨性等方面,15W/40重负荷动力传动通用润滑油的表现略优一些。     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

‘Troops were then forced to fire’: British army crowd control in Palestine,November 1945

In November 1945, British army shooting during street riots and search operations in Palestine resulted in the death of 13 Jews and the injuring of dozens. The most costly in casualties caused by army fire during the whole Jewish insurgency, these incidents have nevertheless not received detailed attention in literature on the British army's counterinsurgency campaign in postwar Palestine. This article outlines British military use of firepower to control civilian crowds and the difficulties involved during these incidents, contributing to the debate on the army's principal of ‘minimum force’. It also highlights the serious problem of legitimizing opening of fire on unarmed protestors, epitomized in the army's fabricated account justifying shooting at a large crowd rushing a military cordon at Givat Hayim.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

Specialization in defence forces

The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform‐sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest‐link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non‐optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer‐to‐most‐desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.     

10W/40高温重负荷润滑油在柴油发动机上的试验

为更好地研究高原地区车辆发动机与油料的适应性,针对高原地区特殊的地理环境气候特点,选用10W/40高温重负荷润滑油,对其进行了理化性能分析、350 h台架可靠性试验及高原实际行车试验。结果表明:该型润滑油具有优良的抗氧抗腐性、清净分散性和抗磨性,可满足高原地区大功率、重负荷柴油发动机的用油要求。