Military expenditure and economic growth: peru 1970–1996

The present study examines the effects of military expenditure on growth in Peru in the period from 1970 to 1996. By using a Deger‐type Simultaneous Equations Model it is possible to break up the net effect into supply‐ and demand‐side influences. The former consist of positive externalities of defence activities on the other sectors of the economy, while the latter can be described as crowding‐out of civilian investment. Estimations find the supply‐side effects to be insignificantly different from zero, while the crowding‐out effect of defence spending is significant and substantial. It is thereby established that defence expenditure has a negative overall effect on economic growth in Peru. Although several caveats – including specification problems of the Deger model, the quality of the data used, a relatively small sample and the presence of autocorrelation in the estimations – must be considered, these results turn out to be quite robust with respect to estimation methods (3SLS, 2SLS, OLS) and slight modifications to the model. They are also consistent with previous empirical findings from other countries and cross sectional studies.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper tests the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth by including the impact of the share of military and civilian components of government expenditure in an economic growth model with endogenous technology. In this framework, we empirically consider the hypothesis of a non‐linear effect of military expenditure on economic growth. Differences between the costs and benefits of the defence sector has traditionally explained the non‐linear relationship suggesting that shocks to insecurity may also be a source of non‐linearity as they determine a re‐allocative effect within government expenditure. While parametric partial correlations are in line with empirical findings, the robustness of estimations is tested by using a non‐parametric approach. The negative relationship between military expenditure and growth in countries with high levels of military burden predicted by theory becomes significant only after including a proxy for re‐allocative effects in the growth equation.     

Resourcing for defense: Solving the roles and missions puzzle

One of the most important issues facing the post‐Cold War U.S. defense establishment concerns the future allocation of combat tasks and responsibilities among different branches of the armed forces. The challenge is to reduce unnecessary redundancy across roles and missions when resources are highly constrained, without compromising military effectiveness. Defining the policy problem as one of resource allocation rather than operational effectiveness, we develop a methodology for allocating roles and missions. Our methodology focuses at the highest level of force aggregation and uses a mathematical programming model to produce cross‐service cross‐mission trade‐offs that will yield the best total force combat and non‐combat potential within resource consumption constraints.     

基于多元价值目标的体系作战信息流转模式探析

高效合理的信息流转模式是有效实施基于信息系统体系作战的前提和重要保障。引入了价值目标理论,解析了信息流转概念内涵,分析了信息流转价值目标与作用机理,分别提出了基于最大信息流量、最佳信息质量、最小传输时间和综合价值目标的体系作战信息流转模式,并给出了信息流转策略。     

舰艇编队作战指挥训练模拟系统组织架构与运行技术

在对舰艇编队作战指挥训练需求分析和训练组织方法梳理的基础上,建立了舰艇编队作战指挥训练模拟系统的系统架构,提出了多层次导调控制技术、一致性训练态势生成分发技术、可扩展训练评估技术,并将其应用于某型编队作战指挥训练模拟系统中,初步验证了该项舰艇编队作战指挥训练模拟系统组织架构与运行技术的可行性。     

基于模型诊断的集合逻辑运算法计算最小碰集

在基于模型的故障诊断仿真系统的诊断流程中,由最小冲突集计算最小碰集是整个流程中的关键步骤。针对现有计算最小碰集方法中存在的缺陷,提出了运用集合逻辑运算法计算最小碰集,将冲突集表示为集合的逻辑"与"、逻辑"或"运算,通过其运算法则进行运算简化,可得到全部的最小碰集。该方法具有简单有效、数据结构简单、计算简便快捷和易于程序实现等优点。最后通过实例计算,验证了该算法的正确性、简单性和高效性。     

舰空导弹超视距协同反导装备体系结构设计方法

以网络化舰空导弹超视距协同反导作战装备发展需求为牵引,基于 DoDAF （ Department of Defense Architecture Framework）1?5体系结构框架,利用体系结构设计软件SA（ System Architect）,对协同反导作战装备体系结构进行了初步探索性和概念性设计,提出了体系结构框架裁减、作战视图设计、系统视图设计和体系结构评估等方法,对实现整个装备体系互连、互通、互操作,以及避免重复建设具有重要指导意义。     

Capacity investment decisions under risk aversion

This article studies the optimal capacity investment problem for a risk‐averse decision maker. The capacity can be either purchased or salvaged, whereas both involve a fixed cost and a proportional cost/revenue. We incorporate risk preference and use a consumption model to capture the decision maker's risk sensitivity in a multiperiod capacity investment model. We show that, in each period, capacity and consumption decisions can be separately determined. In addition, we characterize the structure of the optimal capacity strategy. When the parameters are stationary, we present certain conditions under which the optimal capacity strategy could be easily characterized by a static two‐sided (s, S) policy, whereby, the capacity is determined only at the beginning of period one, and held constant during the entire planning horizon. It is purchased up to B when the initial capacity is below b, salvaged down to Σ when it is above σ, and remains constant otherwise. Numerical tests are presented to investigate the impact of demand volatility on the optimal capacity strategy. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 218–235, 2016