光电型舰炮武器系统模拟训练仪的设计

为解决舰炮武器系统日常训练与检测问题,设计了舰炮武器系统模拟训练仪。介绍了模拟训练仪的组成、工作原理,及硬件、软件技术设计。其主要技术的应用涉及电视视频图象模拟技术、外弹道仿真及水柱坐标处理技术、距离方位法校射模拟技术及计算处理实时性技术。通过试验验证,该模拟训练仪能够很好的用于武器系统的检测和舰员的日常训练。     

现代海战中国外“矛”与“盾”武器的博弈

反舰导弹（矛）与舰载反导武器（盾）之间的斗争是现代海战重要格局之一。美俄二大军事大国在矛与盾的发展上,均以对方为假想敌,研究使自己的矛如何突防对方的盾,以及自己的盾如何拦击对方的矛。由于历史条件,国家政治需要和本国的技术优势不同,二国发展矛与盾的指导思想和设计准则,以及在攻防策略上都有很大不同。文章从深层次分析这些不同特点,并探讨它们的发展走向。     

射向保持方案及影响其精度的因素分析

介绍用于压制兵器的射向保持器的工作原理和计算方法,并通过计算机仿真分析了计算机字长,计算步长,仪器安装糟度以及陀螺仪测量精度等因素对射向保持器精度的影响。     

Saddam versus the inspectors: the impact of regime security on the verification of Iraq’s WMD disarmament

The discovery that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003 raised the question of why Saddam had prevented UN weapons inspectors from fully accounting for his disarmament. The leading explanation for Saddam’s behavior is that he valued ambiguity as part of a strategy of ‘deterrence by doubt’. This article argues that Iraq’s obstruction of inspectors in the late 1990s was motivated by his desire to shield Iraq’s regime security apparatus from UNSCOM’s intrusive counter-concealment inspections. The failure to understand how strongly Saddam’s concerns about his personal safety drove Iraq’s contentious relationship with UNSCOM set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.     

Establishment,simulation and verification of firepower safety control model

On a narrow warship platform, the coordinated use of shipborne weapon systems may cause firepower conflicts, which seriously endangers the ship safety. Meanwhile, with directed-energy weapons mounted on ships, firepower conflicts between weapons become a “high probability event”. Aiming at the problem of firepower safety control, based on the research about the collision probability model of air crafts and space targets and according to the cone of fire model of conventional weapons and directed-energy weapons, this paper solved the firepower conflict probabilities between conventional weapons as well as between conventional weapons and directed-energy weapons respectively using the methods of probability theory, and established the firepower safety control model. Then the calculation of firepower conflict probability was carried out using the dimensionality reduction method based on the equivalent conversion of polar coordinates and the power series method based on Laplace transform. The simulation results revealed that the proposed model and calculation methods are effective and reliable, which can provide theoretical basis and technical support for resolution of firepower conflicts between weapons.     

基于效用分析的武器装备发展方案决策

武器装备发展方案效用决策分析的目的就是以一定的方法和途径,根据决策者对武器装备发展所涉及的各项决策准则的偏好及其对各决策备选方案可能出现风险程度的态度,诱导出决策者对于各项准则的效用函数,从而以诱导的形式综合出各决策备选方案的综合效用,以获得决策者认为是最满意的决策方案.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.     

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO

The disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.