编队辐射源威胁估计研究

针对编队辐射源威胁估计结果在用途上的不同要求,以编队辐射源识别过程为依据,提出了便于编队指挥员把握战场电磁态势的宏观辐射源威胁等级划分方法,并以此为基础,利用多属性决策理论研究了微观编队辐射源威胁系数的计算方法,并以编队电子对抗中的融合识别为例给出了仿真实例。实例表明,该方法可实现编队辐射源威胁估计结果在宏观与微观使用上的统一。     

假目标配置数量模型及其效费比分析

在现代战争中,示假伪装的地位越来越重要。引入了真假目标的发现识别概率的指数分布模型,综合考虑作战时间、真假目标价格比等因素,确定战场生存能力和配置假目标成本两个目标函数,并以最小加权偏差法确定两者权重,建立基于多目标决策的假目标配置数量模型。最后结合实际问题,将各参数条件带入模型计算出假目标的最佳配置数量,同时利用假目标的效费比模型进行检验分析,从而为战时假目标配置数量的确定提供参考依据。     

Modern liberal wars,illiberal allies,and peace as the failure of policy

ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War period nearly up to the present has been characterised as the age of liberal wars, yet key facets of the liberal guidance of war remain under appreciated. This article seeks to address this wider gap with regard to the particular concern of war termination and the fulfilment or failure of policy. First, it develops characterisations of liberal wars based on the existing literature, identifying three broad types through consideration of context—defensive versus offensive—and of political and strategic agency, particularly regarding the motives for and intents of action. Three types of liberal wars result: defensive liberal wars, offensive liberal wars with humanitarian motive and geopolitical intent, and offensive liberal wars with geopolitical motive and humanitarian intent. The article then presents one exemplary case for each liberal war with an emphasis on how liberal strategy required an illiberal ally and that ally's effect on the subsequent peace.     

Pragmatism over principle: US intervention and burden shifting in Somalia, 1992–1993

ABSTRACT

The conventional wisdom about the 1992 US intervention in Somalia is that it was a quintessentially humanitarian mission pushed by President George H. W. Bush. This article challenges that interpretation, drawing on newly declassified documents. The Somalia intervention, I argue, was largely a pragmatic response to concerns held by the US military. In late 1992, as the small UN mission in Somalia was collapsing, senior American generals worried about being drawn into the resulting vacuum. Hence they reluctantly recommended a robust US intervention, in the expectation that this would allow the UN to assemble a larger peacekeeping force that would take over within months. The intervention ultimately failed, but the military learned useful lessons from this experience on how to achieve smoother UN handoffs in the future and thus effectively shift longer-term stabilisation burdens to the international community.