Decision support model for effects estimation and proportionality assessment for targeting in cyber operations

Cyber operations are relatively a new phenomenon of the last two decades.During that period,they have increased in number,complexity,and agility,while their design and development have been processes well kept under secrecy.As a consequence,limited data(sets)regarding these incidents are available.Although various academic and practitioner public communities addressed some of the key points and dilemmas that surround cyber operations(such as attack,target identification and selection,and collateral damage),still methodologies and models are needed in order to plan,execute,and assess them in a responsibly and legally compliant way.Based on these facts,it is the aim of this article to propose a model that i))estimates and classifies the effects of cyber operations,and ii)assesses proportionality in order to support targeting decisions in cyber operations.In order to do that,a multi-layered fuzzy model was designed and implemented by analysing real and virtual realistic cyber operations combined with interviews and focus groups with technical-military experts.The proposed model was evaluated on two cyber operations use cases in a focus group with four technical-military experts.Both the design and the results of the evaluation are revealed in this article.     

信息安全保障与信息作战的关系探究

为了给信息作战计划的制定、行动的实施提供安全保障指导,探讨了信息安全保障与信息作战(IO)之间的关系,以几种典型信息作战要素和信息作战空间的三个层次为对象,详细分析了信息安全保障与二者之间的关系。为军队信息安全保障体系的建立提供一定理论支持。     

维和任务区当地译员的重要作用与素质要求

维和行动中的当地译员是一个特殊群体,在维和任务中具有重要作用。当地译员必须具备保密性、中立性、服务性等基本素质。因此,最大限度地调动当地译员的工作热情、提高其职业素质、是保证维和行动顺利完成的重要环节。     

军警体育教学中认知结构与动作技能的形成

军警动作技能是军警部队官兵所必备的素质之一,也是其具备野外作战能力的基础。但是,有些身体素质良好的军警人员,掌握和发挥动作技能的水平却很低。在教学中要从全新的角度对军警人员获得动作技能的过程进行认知分析,以促进认知结构与动作技能的形成。     

From combat to non-combat action

This paper examines the rationale and centrality of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan, asking why PMSCs are involved in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan and what the principles underlying their activities are. To answer this question, the paper draws attention to the link between humanitarian crises and PMSC interventions. Where there is no meaningful alternative intervention, undergirded by humanitarian concerns that are also profit driven, PMSCs come in to provide the needed services. The protracted and complicated internal armed conflicts in Sudan, which have lasted for over two decades, have produced as many as 4,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the single largest number in the world. The kind of humanitarian assistance operations provided by PMSCs in Sudan have become critical to the provision of much-needed services which were inadequately provided by governmental authorities at both unilateral and multilateral levels. This paper argues that the humanitarian crises in Sudan created a regime that permits humanitarian assistance operations by both state and non-state actors.     

THE PROHIBITION OF BLINDING AS A METHOD OF WARFARE

Abstract

From the 1982 Maitatsine Uprising to the 2009 Kala Kato Riot, Nigeria has been bedevilled by ethno-religious uprisings with devastating human and material losses. In almost all these crises the police and the military have featured prominently as agencies tasked with the responsibility of maintaining law and order and suppressing insurrection. While it was not alleged that they precipitated some of these risings perhaps in their attempts to stem or nip them in the bud, they have been accused of escalating the conflict either by their slow and inadequate responses, their partisanship and their arbitrary responses, or by their slackness in managing the crises and their aftermath. However, but for their efforts the security basis of the Nigerian state would have been considerably compromised by religious fundamentalism given the level of preparedness of the groups involved, their resistance and, more importantly, the recurrent nature of the uprisings. This article reflects on the management of ethno-religious uprisings in Nigeria by the police and the military. It considers the nature of the security agencies' involvement in the crises and examines the factors both within the agencies and in the larger Nigerian society which have aided or hindered their effective management of the conflicts.     

The long and winding road … to success? Unit peace operation effectiveness and its effect on mission success

Why does peacekeeping sometimes fail? How can effective peacekeepers increase the likelihood of success of a mission? The two main flaws in the current evaluations of peace operations are that they mainly rely on already concluded missions and that they make use of indicators that do not reveal micro-level dynamics. This article introduces an analytical framework relating the effectiveness of soldiers to their actual impact in their area of operation in a peace operation. The framework is called “unit peace operation effectiveness” (UPOE). Focusing on soldiers in peace operations, this article shows that: different units behave differently; emphasize different aspects of the mandate; and are effective in different ways. Ultimately, this has an actual impact on the end-state of the mission. It relies on and adapts classic security studies works to theoretically enrich the peacekeeping literature. The model is tested in an illustrative case study based on ethnographic work on French and Italian units in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010.     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.     

When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of Deception

This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.     

Colonial violence and its ‘Small Wars’: fighting the Kuki ‘guerillas’ during the Great War in Northeast India, 1917–1919

ABSTRACT

This paper concerns the lesser known British counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northeast frontier of India during the First World War. Officially known as the ‘Kuki Operations’, it was considered as part of the Great War. Carried out in isolation from press and public, and shelved in colonial archives, the event remained invisible until today. Yet, it registers a critical case of colonial COIN doctrine where the ‘moral effect’ doctrine was employed without being questioned. It unleashed enormous amount of organized violence, ranging from shoot at sight to indiscriminate burning of villages, wholesale destruction of property and livestock, prevention of cultivation and rebuilding of villages, forced mass displacement in jungles or in ‘concentration camps’, and collective punishment (communal penal labour and payment of compensation) after the war. This paper argues that the theory of ‘minimum force’ and the practicability of the ‘moral effect’ doctrine as applied by the Empire, sit oddly with each other at the frontier, where violence was seen both as a natural and moral orders. Violence as an ‘imperatively necessary’ method to bring order in a disorderly frontier, in the opinion of colonial state, informs and registers Northeast India as geography of violence.