潜艇核事故应急评价模式研究

评价模式是核事故应急评价系统的核心．在理论分析的基础上,建立了适合基地特点的潜艇核事故应急评价模式及参数,并通过假想事故对所建立的评价模式进行了校核．结果表明,该模式具有良好的可靠性和可行性,适合基地的特点,满足核潜艇核事故应急评价的要求．根据所建模式,还编制了一套实用、可靠、灵活、方便的应用软件．     

PSA 技术在船舶核动力装置 RCMA 中的应用

从重要功能产品的确定、维修工作类型的选择和维修工作间隔期的确定３个方面出发,说明了概率安全评价（ＰＳＡ）技术在船舶核动力装置以可靠性为中心的维修分析（ＲＣＭＡ）中的应用．     

基于电动增压器的大功率柴油机高原功率恢复研究

高原环境对柴油机的工作性能影响较大,探索在高原环境下柴油机功率的恢复,对车辆在高原地区正常运行具有重要的意义．基于GT-POWER建立某型大功率柴油机整机数值仿真模型,并验证该模型的准确性;确定二级顺序增压系统方案,建立二级顺序增压系统数值仿真模型,通过增加电动增压器实现二级顺序增压的方法恢复柴油机高原使用功率．     

单兵电源系统研究进展与挑战

单兵电源作为单兵作战系统的重要组成部分,对提升单兵作战能力和生存能力具有重要作用。文章论述了单兵作战系统的作用及其对单兵电源的需求,对国内外单兵电源系统的研究进展进行了综述分析,指出了单兵电源系统研究面临的挑战。     

建立装备成体系建设模式，为加快海洋强国建设提供强大力量支撑

建设海洋强国战略目标、建设强大海上军事力量需要探索中国特色的装备体系建设新模式。针对未来信息化战争体系对抗的特点,在研究中外武器装备体系建设经验基础上,提出了海上军事力量装备成体系建设的新模式,并讨论了海上军事力量装备成体系建设的有关问题。     

How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.     

Wisdom without tears: Statecraft and the uses of history

The world is mired in history again, as historical modes of competition return and historical grievances fuel the policies of multiple revisionist actors. If the end of history has ended, then it follows that the time is ripe for an engagement with history’s wisdom. We argue that the making of American statecraft—the deliberate, coordinated use of national power to achieve important objectives—can be significantly enhanced by a better understanding of the past. This essay, which draws on the extensive literature on history and statecraft, U.S. foreign policy, and the author’s own research and experiences, offers a defense of the use of history to improve statecraft, as well as a typology of ten distinct ways in which an understanding of history can improve government policy.     

基于最大电流方法的数字均流总线设计

多个电源模块并联供电系统,最广泛使用基于最大电流方法的自动均流技术,通过专用的模拟均流总线,传输与模块最大电流成正比的电压信号,各个模块使用该电压信号实现均流.该模拟电压信号很容易受到各种噪声影响,导致均流控制失败.针对该问题,设计了单线数字均流总线,实现最大电流值的数字传输.分析结果表明,设计的单线数字均流总线能够实现模拟均流总线相同的功能,并且具有更强的抗干扰能力.     

A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.