海军兵棋演习系统研究

兵棋演习系统是我军未来开展模拟训练的重要手段,针对国内外对兵棋推演系统现状及技术发展趋势进行研究,提出海军兵棋演习系统的发展方向和设计方法,并结合海军兵棋推演的研究内容重点,给出作战规则建模、指挥关系建模等主要关键技术的解决方法,为我国海军未来兵棋推演系统设计、研究和发展提供技术支撑。     

Trading coups for civil war

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency.     

The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations ‘small war’

The first conceptual, theoretical treatises about small war (la petite guerre) as special operations appeared only from the middle of the seventeenth century. The term is not used in the eighteenth-century sense of ‘special operations’ in older sources. The supposed absence of any treatment of the subject is surprising considering the obsession with the ‘art of war’ in the Renaissance, but other authors attribute it to a supposed antinomy between chivalric ideals and irregular warfare. But the absence of explicit manuals on the subject is not evidence of absence of advanced reflection on this kind of operations in the Middle Ages and in Early Modern times. We should thus look elsewhere, in other genres, for writings that contain and pass on military knowledge. Epics, romances, educational and military treatises, and memoirs in fact contain elements of a theory of special operations, even though these genres differ from our conception of rationality inherited from the Enlightenment.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

Conceptual failure,the Taliban's parallel hierarchies,and America's strategic defeat in Afghanistan

ISAF exists to protect the Afghan constitutional model. This strategic objective will be defeated because the GIRoA model has a conceptual flaw that renders it incapable of delivering governance at the local level (Tier IV). This fatal flaw has enabled the Taliban, by developing parallel hierarchies, to displace GIRoA and establish itself in southern locales as the political authority. The Taliban are fighting a revolutionary war, a Maoist displacement strategy that uses guerrilla tactics to advance a political program. Petraeus and McChrystal failed to recognize the character of war, and believed the Taliban are pursuing an exhaustion strategy. They failed to devise a counter-RW strategy. The ‘Surge’ was doomed ab initio.     

美军战略传播中的“叙事”策略

随着互联网技术的飞速发展,信息传播对国家政治、经济、外交和国防带来巨大冲击和影响。美军意识到传播叙事是政府和军队塑造形象、谋划战略、输出文化价值观的重要手段。美国从"重讲故事"的角度出发,将"叙事"包装成对外战略传播的新型方式,从思维认知、情感操控、舆论引导等方面强化对对手的心理威慑和影响,同时以新媒体为媒介扩大叙事传播的影响受众,进而达到物理打击所难以发挥的影响。     

基于云模型的导弹信息作战指挥效能评估

针对导弹信息作战指挥效能评估中既包含定量指标,又包含定性指标,而对这些指标进行科学合理地统一评价尚存在很多困难的问题,运用云模型对其进行了研究。分析了导弹信息作战指挥能力的指标体系,介绍了云模型的相关理论,并给出了运用云模型进行效能评估的详细算法,利用云发生器得到了最终的评估结果。最后给出了一个评估实例,结果证明该方法有效可行,能很好地解决效能评估中定性语言到定量值之间的转化问题。     

基于混合星座的卫星导航系统功率增强服务性能分析

在导航战中,卫星功率增强技术是提高战区卫星导航系统生存能力的重要措施.针对导航战背景下如何保持Compass系统对我国领土及周边区域导航服务能力的问题进行了研究,提出了一种基于混合星座和最优GDOP值准则的卫星导航系统功率增强方案,并就功率增强覆盖区域在不同实现方式条件下的覆盖性、可用性和实现复杂度等性能进行了对比分析.分析结果表明,采用“5GEO +4MEO”的功率增强组合形式,可以实现对我国领土及近海区域的全天时覆盖,可用性水平达到100％( GDOP ＜6.3),同时具有实现复杂度低和系统稳定性好等特点,可作为我国区域功率增强的备选方案.     

一种可扩展的Cyber空间作战体系描述模型

研究了Cyber空间作战体系模型构建技术,提出一种面向Cyber空间作战模拟的战争系统建模新思路,并以此为基础提出了Cyber空间作战体系一体化逻辑网络模型。将Cyber空间作战涉及到的敌我双方作战实体视为一个整体系统的组分,抽象为网络模型的实体节点,实体间的各种合作、协同、对抗等不同类型交互行为统一抽象为网络模型的逻辑边。针对网络模型的节点和边分别建立了基于本体的实体描述模型和基于OO-LAMBDA语言的行为描述模型。通过一个真实战例的仿真实验验证了本文提出的方法的有效性和正确性。