Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1

Kovenock and Roberson's [2011] comment provides initial work which has the potential, when suitably extended, to advance the research frontier. Kovenock and Roberson's paper consists of three sections. The first section is an interesting introduction. The second section, titled ‘Model and Main Result,’ provides no contribution beyond Hausken [2008a]. It consists of Equations (1)–(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken, and Equation (11) which is equivalent to the utility requirements u???0 and U???0 provided after Equation (17) in Hausken. The third section provides interesting ideas about mixed-strategy equilibria that can be extended in future research.     

PEACEKEEPERS AS PERPETRATORS OF ABUSE

I am afraid there is clear evidence that acts of gross misconduct have taken place. This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I am absolutely outraged by it.

—Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General

Despite promulgating a comprehensive set of guidelines to deter UN personnel from committing acts of sexual misconduct, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have become widespread within United Nations peacekeeping missions. The policy of zero-tolerance for peacekeeper misconduct has not been matched by strong disciplinary measures, and crimes are often ignored and rarely punished: absentee fathers, rapists and murderers simply disappear back in their home countries. In countries where women and children rarely have the same economic resources, political rights and authority or control over their environment—or their bodies—they easily become prey for those in perceived positions of power and authority. By failing to hold those responsible to account, the UN may in fact be fuelling even greater discrimination and violence against women and children. In order to ensure those who are mandated to protect to do not become perpetrators of abuse, the UN must take a stronger stand against those who commit acts of sexual misconduct, and must ensure that victims see that their abuser is brought to justice and that reparation is offered. A recent report submitted by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse makes a comprehensive set of recommendations to prevent, detect, and respond to these allegations. The aim of this essay is to highlight some of the main points of the Special Envoy's report, and to examine the practical challenges the UN and troop/police contributing countries will face when attempting to implement these recommendations.     

A Muslim by any other name

Abstract

A crisis is emerging in the Nile Basin, where some 300 million people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi rely on the Nile directly or indirectly. Egypt and Sudan wish to preserve a regime based on treaties drawn up during the colonial era that allocated the vast majority of the Nile's water to them. Countries upstream are determined to challenge this. In 1999 the countries using the river formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try to resolve these differences. More than a decade of negotiations failed to break the impasse. In May Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda decided to wait no longer and signed a new treaty, without the consent of Egypt and Sudan. The signatories have given the other Nile Basin countries one year to join the pact. For Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water, this is a question of life or death. Egypt has, in the past, indicated it will go to war if its share of the Nile is reduced. Talks continue, but the impasse is driving the region towards a crisis to which there is no easy resolution.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

THE PROHIBITION OF BLINDING AS A METHOD OF WARFARE

Abstract

From the 1982 Maitatsine Uprising to the 2009 Kala Kato Riot, Nigeria has been bedevilled by ethno-religious uprisings with devastating human and material losses. In almost all these crises the police and the military have featured prominently as agencies tasked with the responsibility of maintaining law and order and suppressing insurrection. While it was not alleged that they precipitated some of these risings perhaps in their attempts to stem or nip them in the bud, they have been accused of escalating the conflict either by their slow and inadequate responses, their partisanship and their arbitrary responses, or by their slackness in managing the crises and their aftermath. However, but for their efforts the security basis of the Nigerian state would have been considerably compromised by religious fundamentalism given the level of preparedness of the groups involved, their resistance and, more importantly, the recurrent nature of the uprisings. This article reflects on the management of ethno-religious uprisings in Nigeria by the police and the military. It considers the nature of the security agencies' involvement in the crises and examines the factors both within the agencies and in the larger Nigerian society which have aided or hindered their effective management of the conflicts.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.     

A critique of Paul Collier's ‘greed and grievance’ thesis of civil war

Paul Collier has produced a well-written and apparently plausible thesis on ‘greed and grievance’, evidenced in several published texts, which concludes unambiguously that greed, not grievance, is overwhelmingly the cause of conflict. However, Collier has based these findings upon narrowly defined quantitative measures–three defined indices of greed and four indices of grievance. Collier consciously omitted indices which he found difficult to measure, such as suppliers of armaments and opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. However, he appears to have unwittingly omitted some further factors, including governance, management mechanisms for natural resources and the influence that charismatic leadership can have on rebel groups. These omissions can be viewed as a major flaw in Collier's work. They also explain why Collier has diagnosed that civil wars are more likely to occur in some countries in the developing world without offering adequate explanation of why this may be so.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Piracy,state capacity and root causes

By comparing the Somali experience of piracy with the emerging situation in the Gulf of Guinea, I show that increases in the enforcement aspects of state capacity in the Gulf of Guinea states are necessary but not sufficient tools to combat the emergence, growth, and institutionalisation of piracy. Such tools would require state-building measures that would minimise the incentives of individuals to join piracy organisations and they would have to effectively deal with youth unemployment, income inequality, and environmental degradation.