基于聚类算法的多无人机系统任务分配

针对现有任务分配方法在任务点较多时不易解算,且计算量大的问题,提出了基于模糊C-均值聚类算法的多无人机系统任务分配方法.首先,利用模糊C-均值聚类算法得到的隶属度矩阵对任务点进行初始分配;其次,针对基于空间划分聚类可能造成各UAV任务不均衡的问题,设计任务的局部优化调整规则;最后,结合单旅行商问题,利用Tabu Sea...     

Optimal sample size allocation for tests with multiple levels of stress with extreme value regression

In this article, we discuss the optimal allocation problem in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment when an extreme value regression model is used for statistical analysis. We derive the maximum likelihood estimators, the Fisher information, and the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators. Three optimality criteria are defined and the optimal allocation of units for two‐ and k‐stress level situations are determined. We demonstrate the efficiency of the optimal allocation of units in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment by using real experimental situations discussed earlier by McCool and Nelson and Meeker. Monte Carlo simulations are used to show that the optimality results hold for small sample sizes as well. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

New heuristic methods for the capacitated multi‐facility Weber problem

In this paper we consider the capacitated multi‐facility Weber problem with the Euclidean, squared Euclidean, and ?_p‐distances. This problem is concerned with locating m capacitated facilities in the Euclidean plane to satisfy the demand of n customers with the minimum total transportation cost. The demand and location of each customer are known a priori and the transportation cost between customers and facilities is proportional to the distance between them. We first present a mixed integer linear programming approximation of the problem. We then propose new heuristic solution methods based on this approximation. Computational results on benchmark instances indicate that the new methods are both accurate and efficient. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2006     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

反舰导弹机动与导引配合的弹道设计研究

传统反舰导弹的末端机动与导引是分别进行的,这使得突防效果的提升受限。为了达到提高突防概率和实现高精度导引的双重目的,需要在导弹的末段实现机动与导引协同配合的设计。利用弹目之间的几何关系,规划设计了根据弹目实时连线进行自适应蛇行机动的程序参考信号。整个设计可以看作比例导引法与蛇行机动的复合,利用的信号包括实测的雷达方位角信号、弹目距离与预先设计好的时间指令。     

区域防空导弹反导火力分配研究

分析了传统防空导弹火力分配模型的不足,考虑到编队内各舰艇近程防空作战能力的不同,结合装备性能特点,建立了基于机会约束规划的区域防空导弹火力分配优化模型。给出了基于遗传算法和BP神经网络的混合智能算法,该算法在精度和速度上均能满足防空作战的要求。     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

基于遗传算法舰船装载码头配置方案优化

两栖输送舰船码头装载过程中,如何科学配置装载码头,使得整个装载任务完成时间最短是部队制定装载方案需要解决的重要难题。依据码头装载配置特点和要求,运用军事运筹学多目标规划理论构建装载码头配置规划模型,并运用遗传算法理论和计算机编程工具实现码头配置规划模型的优化解算。从而提高了部队两栖输送舰船码头装载方案制定的科学性和时效性。     

Budget allocation,national security,military intelligence,and human capital: a dynamic model

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country’s military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government’s various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli–Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country’s future security and welfare.