The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.     

基于多变元网络的Cyber作战建模方法

Cyberspace是近年出现的一个新概念,分析了Cyberspace的概念及特性,提出Cyberspace层次概念模型,在此基础上,提出基于多变元网络的Cyber作战建模方法,认为Cyber作战建模可以分为对战争系统静态结构建模和交战行为动态交互建模,并对应分别建立了Cyberspace战争系统的多变元网络模型和Cyber作战交战行为的多变元网络演化模型,最后运用所建立的模型对一个典型Cyber战进行了分析.     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3     

AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

论动物用于生物武器的新角色

文章通过对动物生物武器概念、特点的介绍,分析了利用基因技术改造动物源病原体,甚至动物本身作为生物武器的方式,提出了我国防御动物为主体的生物恐怖的建议.     

论公安边防部队党组织建设中的“一单三制”制度

为解决部分党员领导干部不认真过双重组织生活的问题,上海边防总队确立了发放组织生活通知单和组织生活公示制、报告制、通报制,这对于党员领导干部过好组织生活起到了很好的规范作用。严格落实"一单三制"制度,需要把握好三个环节:一要筑牢思想基础,增强落实制度的责任感;二要强化管理监督,提升落实制度的严肃性;三要建立配套制度,提高制度落实的规范性。     

公安消防部门应对重特大火灾事故信息传播策略

重特大火灾事故发生后,若信息传播处置不当,容易形成危机事件。作为处置突发事件的主力军之一,公安消防部门应利用自身优势,在重特大火灾事故信息传播中发挥作用。分析了其在信息传播过程中应当恪守的基本原则,提出应从加强机制建立、强化培训教育、加强舆情监测等方面采取措施进行重特大火灾事故信息传播。