相控阵雷达维修方案优选方法研究

针对相控阵雷达维修方案的选择问题,确定了维修方案的决策属性,并提出一种基于改进TOPSIS法的相控阵雷达维修方案优选方法。该方法通过引入Vague集来处理维修方案选择中存在的模糊信息,并采用博弈论综合赋权法来确定决策属性的综合权重。通过计算各备选方案与正、负理想方案的灰色关联度,得到了维修方案的灰色关联相对贴近度,进而实现对维修方案的排序和选择。最后,通过算例应用与分析,对提出的方法进行了验证。     

航天器轨道追逃动力学与控制问题研究综述

随着航天器交会与接近操作技术的快速发展,轨道追逃问题逐渐成为航天领域的研究热点。从动力学与控制视角,对航天器轨道追逃问题的研究现状进行综述。给出了基于定量微分对策的轨道追逃问题模型的一般形式,系统梳理了各种类型的轨道追逃问题;对于追逃策略求解,分别针对闭环策略和开环策略,分析了各种方法的优缺点;围绕人工智能算法与轨道追逃问题的结合,阐述了基于深度神经网络和强化学习的轨道追逃策略的研究现状。关于未来展望,提出了追逃博弈态势分析、多航天器博弈控制、三体条件下博弈动力学与控制等发展方向。     

Potential impact of recharging plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles on locational marginal prices

Plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), upon market penetration, will create additional recharging loads to the electric power systems. This article considers different recharging scenarios and uses game theoretic models to study the potential impact of the recharging loads on locational marginal prices (wholesale electricity prices). Computational results from a Pennsylvania‐New Jersey‐Maryland Interconnection case study show that, under the existing recharging infrastructures, even a small magnitude of load increase caused by PHEV recharging could have a significant undesirable impact on locational marginal prices. The impact could be mitigated to a varying extent by the availability of possible future recharging infrastructures, including realtime pricing recharging meters, battery stations, or vehicle‐to‐grid technology.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型

讨论了策略集清晰、支付值模糊的模糊双矩阵对策的一种求解方法,并以某型导弹混编群对抗ARM（反辐射导弹）及载机为案例进行研究,建立了基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型,研究结果对于双方资源分配,提高作战效能具有一定的军事应用价值。     

微分对策及其在军事领域的研究进展*

介绍了微分对策的产生背景及其半个多世纪以来的发展历程,简述了国内外微分对策理论发展的几个重要阶段及其标志性成果。全面地阐述了国内外关于微分对策在军事领域的应用研究状况,特别是美、俄等军事强国在微分对策军事应用研究方面的现状以及我国研究人员在该领域的主要研究成果。还进一步论述了微分对策在军事应用研究方面存在的问题,并对微分对策的发展前景做出了展望,指出了微分对策在军事应用领域中的研究热点、难点和主要发展方向。     

联合作战的远程火力战法动态分析方法*

用定量动态分析方法开发远程火力战法是联合作战规划中必须解决的重要问题。借助仿真和博弈分析的混合方法,在对博弈效用函数计算的基础上,构建基于识别真目标、假目标以及火力命中目标概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型来开发远程火力战法动态分析方法,对两个典型的联合作战远程火力打击战法性能的初步动态分析表明:战场势态的动态变化直接影响定量规划最优战法的结果。     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

对策理论的防空作战决策级融合模型

随着防空C3I系统的发展,防空作战决策的过程较以往更为自动化,用于生成各种作战辅助决策方案的计算机模型也具备随着作战环境改变所表现出一定的自适应调整的特征.影响防空作战决策结果正确性的因素众多,表现这些因素的信息有些是冲突的,为得到更为准确、有效的决策方案,各类冲突信息的处理成为防空作战的核心问题.构造了一种在冲突信息环境下基于对策理论的融合模型,以对策理论的相关算法实现了融合中心各类信息的交互决策.实践表明,这一融合模型能有效地解决防空作战决策中各类信息的综合处理问题,具有一定的实用价值.     

Designing rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns for strategic (but distracted) contributors

In rewards-based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs solicit donations from a large number of individual contributors. If total donations exceed a prespecified funding target, the entrepreneur distributes nonmonetary rewards to contributors; otherwise, their donations are refunded. We study how to design such campaigns when contributors choose not just whether to contribute, but also when to contribute. We show that strategic contribution behavior—when contributors intentionally delay until campaign success is likely—can arise from the combination of nonrefundable (potentially very small) hassle costs and the risk of campaign failure, and can explain pledging patterns commonly observed in crowdfunding. Furthermore, such delays do not hurt the entrepreneur if contributors are perfectly rational, but they do if contributors are distracted, that is, if they might fail to return to the campaign after an intentional delay. To mitigate this, we find that an entrepreneur can use a simple menu of rewards with a fixed number of units sold at a low price, and an unlimited number sold at a higher price; this segments contributors over time based on the information they observe upon arrival. We show that, despite its simplicity, such a menu performs well compared to a theoretically optimal menu consisting of an infinite number of different rewards and price levels under many conditions.     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.