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11.
This study investigates the statistical process control application for monitoring queue length data in M/G/1 systems. Specifically, we studied the average run length (ARL) characteristics of two different control charts for detecting changes in system utilization. First, the nL chart monitors the sums of successive queue length samples by subgrouping individual observations with sample size n. Next is the individual chart with a warning zone whose control scheme is specified by two pairs of parameters, (upper control limit, du) and (lower control limit, dl), as proposed by Bhat and Rao (Oper Res 20 (1972) 955–966). We will present approaches to calculate ARL for the two types of control charts using the Markov chain formulation and also investigate the effects of parameters of the control charts to provide useful design guidelines for better performance. Extensive numerical results are included for illustration. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011 相似文献
12.
A genetic algorithm with neighborhood search for the resource‐constrained project scheduling problem
The resource‐constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP) consists of a set of non‐preemptive activities that follow precedence relationship and consume resources. Under the limited amount of the resources, the objective of RCPSP is to find a schedule of the activities to minimize the project makespan. This article presents a new genetic algorithm (GA) by incorporating a local search strategy in GA operators. The local search strategy improves the efficiency of searching the solution space while keeping the randomness of the GA approach. Extensive numerical experiments show that the proposed GA with neighborhood search works well regarding solution quality and computational time compared with existing algorithms in the RCPSP literature, especially for the instances with a large number of activities. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011 相似文献
13.
In many practical multiserver queueing systems, servers not only serve randomly arriving customers but also work on the secondary jobs with infinite backlog during their idle time. In this paper, we propose a c‐server model with a two‐threshold policy, denoted by (e d), to evaluate the performance of this class of systems. With such a policy, when the number of idle servers has reached d (<c), then e (<d) idle agents will process secondary jobs. These e servers keep working on the secondary jobs until they find waiting customers exist in the system at a secondary job completion instant. Using the matrix analytic method, we obtain the stationary performance measures for evaluating different (e, d) policies. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007. 相似文献
14.
A. Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):109-114
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
15.
Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
16.
Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017 相似文献
17.
We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation. 相似文献
18.
Emmanuel Terkimbi Akov 《African Security Review》2017,26(3):288-307
The resource debate is easily discerned as part of the ongoing history of farmer–herdsman conflict in the North Central region of Nigeria. Scarcity theorists are adept at linking scarcity with the onset of livelihood conflict while on the other hand resource abundance pundits insist it is profusion and not scarcity that impels conflict. This article traverses these wrangles and proceeds to downplay the resource polemic altogether. It is proposed that the resource debate, despite its profoundness, presents a narrow reading of farmer–herdsman clashes in Nigeria’s North Central region. It is suggested that a number of other factors, including elite land grabbing, ethno-religious identity construction, weak state capabilities, the citizenship question, corrupt traditional institutions, the lack of an effective land tenure system and a widespread culture of impunity, make for better readings of the conflict. Owing to the negative impacts of the conflict on state and society, it is recommended that the state in Nigeria should commit itself to addressing the citizenship question, strengthening the capabilities of security institutions, extirpating the culture of impunity and revaluing its policy on land redistribution. 相似文献
19.
Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect. 相似文献
20.