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We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 相似文献
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动态频谱接入面临的关键技术之一是对接入时机和方式进行有效地管控,防止由于频谱的接入使用过于灵活造成用频的干扰和混乱。将频谱接入的时间和方式给予规则上的约束和指导,基于规则构建动态频谱管理框架可以有效实现频谱的实时管控。对动态频谱接入的规则及表述方式进行了讨论,分析了基于规则的动态频谱接入过程,最后结合美军XG项目的试验结果分析了基于规则的动态频谱接入的应用前景。 相似文献
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为了对转矩分流齿轮系统均载特性进行更加深入的研究,建立系统非线性动力学模型,采用数值仿真方法计算系统的均载系数,分析联动轴扭转刚度、输出轴支撑刚度、输入转速以及轴位角对均载系数的影响规律,并对齿轮系统进行实验研究.研究结果表明:输出端的均载系数大于输入端的均载系数,高压输入端的均载系数大于低压输入端的均载系数;均载系数... 相似文献
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Greys Sošić 《海军后勤学研究》2010,57(3):279-295
In their recent article, Leng and Parlar (L&P) (2009) analyze information‐sharing alliances in a three‐level supply chain (consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer) that faces a nonstationary end demand. Supply chain members can share demand information, which reduces information distortion and thus decreases their inventory holding and shortage costs. We expand the results from L&P by considering dynamic (farsighted) stability concepts. We use two different allocation rules and show that under some reasonable assumptions there should always be some information sharing in this supply chain. We also identify conditions under which the retailer in a stable outcome shares his demand information with the distributor, with the manufacturer, or with both remaining supply chain members. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010 相似文献
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