邻域加强的并行子空间优化过程

针对基于响应面的并行子空间优化(CSSo-RS)过程的不足,提出了基于邻域加强的改进CSSO-RS优化过程.其主要思路是在子空间优化后,在得到的最优解附近进行全部变量的优化,以更好地协调系统级优化与子空间优化.用经典测试函数及通用航空飞机参数优化问题对该算法进行测试,测试结果表明该算法使CSSO-RS优化效率得到较大的...     

飞行器多学科设计优化理论的工程应用

目前,飞行器的多学科设计优化(MDO)方法研究已经成为国际上航天领域的一个研究热点,但在我国,与MDO基础理论研究的迅速发展相比,MDO的工程应用研究相对滞后,甚至导致部分飞行器设计人员对于MDO理论的实用性产生质疑.本文结合我们近十多年来的研究工作,在分析MDO工程应用所面临困难的基础上,总结了MDO工程应用研究的关...     

基于作战能力图的兵力部署评估仿真

运用电子地图的发展成果和技术,通过将联合作战兵力转化为具有一定属性值的作战能力像素点,以点阵图形式来显示和研究兵力部署,实现对联合作战兵力部署的评估,为定量化研究联合作战兵力运用提供一种辅助决策的新方法.     

基于LS-SVM的飞机保障性预测评估建模

针对飞机保障性预测评估建模难的问题,基于统计学习理论,采用LS-SVM方法,建立了飞机保障性的预测模型。仿真试验结果表明,LS-SVM具有很高的建模精度和较强的泛化能力,从而验证了该方法的有效性和先进性。     

China's Global Equity Oil Investments: Economic and Geopolitical Influences

In this article, we construct and analyze an original database of overseas Chinese equity oil investments (EOI) in order to assess the relative importance of economic and geopolitical factors in determining the type of countries that are most likely to receive those investments. We find that China's national oil companies (NOCs) choose to make considerable investments in certain oil rich countries while ignoring others. We develop and examine ‘economic opportunity’ and ‘geopolitical relevance’ explanations of Chinese EOI. The economic explanation assumes that Chinese oil companies operate autonomously despite the fact that they are state owned, and that they seek international experience in countries offering less competition but more risk. The geopolitical explanation suggests that Chinese equity oil investments are developed and coordinated by the central government as part of a geopolitical strategy that is designed to bypass the so-called ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and deepen security ties with oil-rich states through the conduct of oil diplomacy. We argue that Chinese EOI tends to reflect both corporate interests and government priorities, and that it generates more liabilities rather than benefits for China.     

The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy

Washington's so-called Maritime Strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to full fruition during the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow”s strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war. Relying on a variety of interviews and newly declassified documents, the authors assert that the Maritime Strategy represents one of the rare instances in history when intelligence helped lead a nation to completely revise its concept of military operations.     

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

The Zimbabwe people’s revolutionary army military operations in Makonde district and the attack on Salisbury’s fuel storage tanks, 1965-1979

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army operations in Mashonaland West province with particular reference to Makonde District during the country’s war of liberation. Despite the growing literature on ZAPU and ZPRA in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation there is little that has been written concerning the operations of ZPRA guerrillas in Mashonaland provinces. Guided by evidence drawn from secondary and primary sources the article further asserts that ZPRA adopted a four pronged strategy in Makonde District. This strategy in part was hinged on the politicization of the population on the one hand and annihilation of the enemy forces, attrition and manoeuvre warfare on the other. Again, the article argues that ZPRA guerrillas attempted to capture Salisbury (Harare) in order to conquer the Rhodesian Security Forces’ centre of gravity. It was hoped that the capture of the capital city would Makoni District was of strategic significance to the conduct of ZPRA operations and arguably hastened Ian Smith’s decision to attend the Lancaster House Conference negotiations that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.     

Past failures and future problems: the psychology of irregular war

Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies- a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engagement. In the event of major conflict, environmentally sensitized military planners will be better able to achieve military and policy objectives.