Mixed rules in multi‐issue allocation situations

Multi‐issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be divided among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two‐stage rule. First, we divide the estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to their demands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real‐world problems: the distribution of natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for education and research between universities.     

适应低时延业务需求的分布式可穿戴单兵作战信息系统

针对云计算应用在单兵作战系统场景下业务处理时延高、服务质量无法保障的问题,提出一种基于可穿戴计算的分布式单兵作战信息系统。利用士兵身上的可穿戴智能设备构建本地计算层,在作战地点就近处理计算数据,提供给士兵本地的信息处理与融合能力,并采用广义扩散负载均衡算法平衡各设备负载,降低业务处理时延;同时利用分布式计算的容错能力增强系统的可靠性。仿真结果表明,基于可穿戴设备的分布式本地网络架构能有效地降低作战任务的处理时延,同时增强系统的可靠性。     

武器装备可用性设计对寿命周期费用的影响及控制

可用性设计是装备综合保障分析的重要内容.合适的可用度指标不但要满足装备效能要求,还应满足费用约束条件.为了设计并选择出费效比最高的保障方案,研究了可用性设计对装备寿命周期费用的影响,提出了运用可用度门限值来控制寿命周期费用的方法,并举例说明具体的应用.最后,就保障性设计中的费用权衡问题提出了几点建议.     

军用飞机采购价格的RBF神经网络预测

分析了现代军用飞机采购价格估算中存在的问题.应用基于k-均值聚类算法的RBF神经网络建立了军用飞机采购价格预测模型,并采用该模型对某型军用飞机采购价格进行了预测.与多元线性回归和BP神经网络的预测结果对比,建立的新型军用飞机采购价格预测模型具有更高的预测精度,为军用飞机采购价格预测提供了一种新的有效方法.     

On a class of multiple failure mode systems

The primary objective of this work is to introduce and perform a detailed study of a class of multistate reliability structures in which no ordering in the levels of components' performances is necessary. In particular, the present paper develops the basic theory (exact reliability formulae, reliability bounds, asymptotic results) that will make it feasible to investigate systems whose components are allowed to experience m ≥ 2 kinds of failure (failure modes), and their breakdown is described by different families of cut sets in each mode. For illustration purposes, two classical (binary) systems are extended to analogous multiple failure mode structures, and their reliability performance (bounds and asymptotic behavior) is investigated by numerical experimentation. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 167–185, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10007     

When to commit in a serial supply chain with forecast updating

Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

The value of information sharing in a two‐stage supply chain with production capacity constraints

We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

软件保障费用估算模型研究

分析了软件保障费用的基本构成和一般表达式,构建了软件错误更改费用估算模型、新功能保障费用估算模型和有时间限制的保障费用估算模型,并结合实例进行了分析。软件保障模型估算的研究对提高软件保障费用估算的精度和效率有重要意义。     

Competition under time‐varying demands and dynamic lot sizing costs

We develop a competitive pricing model which combines the complexity of time‐varying demand and cost functions and that of scale economies arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. Each firm can replenish inventory in each of the T periods into which the planning horizon is partitioned. Fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred for each procurement order, along with inventory carrying costs. Each firm adopts, at the beginning of the planning horizon, a (single) price to be employed throughout the horizon. On the basis of each period's system of demand equations, these prices determine a time series of demands for each firm, which needs to service them with an optimal corresponding dynamic lot sizing plan. We establish the existence of a price equilibrium and associated optimal dynamic lotsizing plans, under mild conditions. We also design efficient procedures to compute the equilibrium prices and dynamic lotsizing plans.© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009