NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

Domestic violence legislation for development,peace and security in Nigeria

Though laws have been enacted in different parts of Nigeria to address some aspects of gender-based violence, domestic violence persists with serious consequences for social and economic development. Nigeria has not enacted specific domestic law that is applicable throughout the federation, despite the United Nations mandate to all countries to adopt and enforce such laws by 2015. This article examines the causes and nature of domestic violence in Nigeria, and the legal reform needed to address the situation. In addition to library sources, the study used focus group discussions and individual interviews (involving the general population, key informants, legislators and traditional rulers) to discover that enacting specific national domestic violence legislation is necessary to address the problem in Nigeria, but enacting laws alone is not a magic bullet.     

The BWC protocol mandate for failure

The stage may be set for what could be a historic turning point in America's reliance on nuclear weapons to meet its fundamental national security interests. Proponents of a refurbished nuclear stockpile and infrastructure are convinced that nuclear weapons will remain central to U.S. security interests, yet they admit that there is no national consensus on the need for and role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear opponents are gravely concerned that to the extent nuclear refurbishment creates a global perception that nuclear weapons remain essential instruments, it will eviscerate nuclear nonproliferation measures precisely at a time when nuclear ambitions are growing. Moreover, opponents see deterrence through advanced conventional weapons as decisively more credible than any nuclear alternative. With hopes of elevating discourse to the national level, this article examines the key current arguments pro and con within the specialist community and forecasts changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next decade. It concludes with a brief prognosis on prospects for complete nuclear disarmament.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

The Trust Paradox in Nuclear Smuggling

ABSTRACT

This article explores the paradox of trust in the largest nuclear smuggling operation involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) discussed in open source literature. In the first effort to understand the type, extent, and role of trust in nuclear smuggling enterprises, it draws from literature on trust development in legitimate businesses as well as criminal enterprises. Observed behavioral patterns in this case challenge traditional notions of the internal dynamics of temporary groups engaged in nuclear smuggling and operational realities of such activities. The article seeks to explain why individuals agree (and continue) to operate in this high-risk environment, unbound by close personal ties, without any effort to verify the background, motives, or qualifications of the fellow conspirators. It offers ways to advance current nonproliferation efforts in non-state actor interdiction by exploiting the environment of shallow trust in temporary groups.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland

The role of the British Army in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner (1969–2007) is an instructive case study of counterinsurgency operations as well as an important chapter in recent British military history. Given troops deployed to the province as aid to the civil power, it is particularly useful in discussions about the principle of minimum force. This article seeks to explore the issue of minimum force through the example of Operation Motorman, the Army's successful attempt to remove the barricades, which had established so-go areas for the security forces in Northern Ireland.     

公安警卫信息化建设刍议

警卫部队信息化建设为警卫部队在新时期更好地完成党和人民赋予的各项警卫任务提供了更加便捷和有效的服务与保障。分析警卫信息化建设的必要性和重要性,探讨警卫信息化建设中需要建立健全的几个应用性系统。