Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Pool it,share it,or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities

In a general and economical view, this article analyzes methods and mechanisms for the pooling and sharing of military forces and weapons inside the European Union (EU) in times of scarcity. Pooling and sharing could improve the EU military capabilities significantly if differences in location factors were taken into account and all states would focus on their respective strengths. More competition and less concentration are the keys to ensuring guaranteed access to military assets. Pooling and sharing are likely to be successful only if large states enhance their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self-help, and reduce particularistic and parochial interests of local gain. The realm of personnel has the most potential for improvement but any change is likely to generate policy implications.     

无人机集群作战概念及关键技术分析

无人机集群作战正在从概念走向雏形.文章总结了国外无人机集群作战概念的发展,分析了无人机集群作战的主要关键技术,包括大规模无人机管理与控制、多无人机自主编队飞行、集群感知与态势共享、集群突防与攻击、集群作战任务控制站等技术,并展望了未来无人机集群协同搜索、协同干扰、协同攻击、协同察/打、集群对抗等作战应用.     

国防基础研究的管理模式

国防基础研究是国防科技创新的源头和武器装备可持续发展的重要保障.文章分析了国防基础研究的内涵及规律,在此基础上有针对性地研究了国防基础研究实施中的管理模式问题,包括主管部门、承研主体、第三方监督评价等,以期为国防基础研究的健康可持续发展提供参考.     

对抗条件下防空武器系统效能评估

空袭和防空是对立存在的。针对现有防空武器系统作战效能评估模型的不足,指出了研究攻防对抗条件下评估防空武器系统作战效能的必要性。通过对防空武器系统与空袭敌机攻防对抗过程的分析,建立了攻防对抗条件下防空武器系统的效能评估模型,借助计算机仿真证明了该模型符合实际作战情况,具有较高的置信度,是对传统防空武器系统效能评估方法的一种完善和补充。     

水面舰艇编队空中威胁扇面角预测模型

针对水面舰艇编队空中威胁扇面角的预测问题,分析了影响空中威胁扇面角大小的主要因素。以具有航路规划能力的远程反舰导弹为对象,从航空兵及远程反舰导弹的作战使用特点和装备性能限制着手,建立了计算威胁扇面角的数学模型。通过仿真分析,得出了主要参数对威胁扇面角的影响规律,为水面舰艇编队对空防御兵力的配置提供了依据。     

基于无标度网络的防空反导系统构建

构建高效的防空反导系统是防空反导作战的基础。运用复杂网络理论,建立基于无标度网络防空反导系统模型,并将其统计特征同基于WS小世界网络的模型进行了比较,得出基于无标度网络的防空反导系统有更好鲁棒性和抗毁性,对网络化防空反导系统的构建有一定参考价值。     

The industrial structure of National Defence and transaction costs

A recent paper in Defence Economics suggests that “a single variable, the public opinion balance, ... when accompanied by a control variable measuring the proportion of responses in the ‘residuum’ (no opinion or keep the status quo), permits an accurate prediction of subsequent changes in the rate of change of U.S. defense outlays from the mid‐1960s through the 1980s” (Higgs and Kilduff, 1993, p. 227). In contrast, this comment provides evidence that since 1986 the Higgs‐Kilduff model frequently mispredicts the direction of U.S. defense spending. In addition, the average prediction error, and its variance, since 1986 consistently exceeds the average prediction error, and its variance, for the years prior to 1986.     

Defense Burden and the Effect of Democracy: Evidence from a Spatial Panel Analysis

ABSTRACT

Do democracies spend less on national defense? This paper provides new evidence of the effect of democracy on defense burden based on a Spatial Durbin Model with panel data for 98 countries for the years 1992–2008. While democracy measured by means of an index variable covering the entire range from perfect democracy to perfect autocracy turns out to be insignificant, dummy variables indicating transition to higher levels of democracy reveal a statistically highly significant negative effect of democracy on a country’s defense burden. Allowing for country-specific effects reveals heterogeneity in the effect of democracy across countries. Apart from the effect of democracy, the estimation results indicate strong spatial dependence of military burdens across countries. Moreover, they provide statistical evidence for a peace dividend, for substitution effects in defense spending and for a negative effect on the military burden for countries when they exhibit a trade surplus instead of a trade deficit.