可靠性鉴定中 Bayes 方法的运用

本文论述可靠性鉴定的Bayes方法。文中讨论了成败型和寿命型两种模型。给出了可靠性鉴定方法及可能犯的两种错误的概率计算公式。论述中,充分注意了工程实践中出现的问题,并提出了处置方法。     

武器装备的使用可靠性及其保障

在分析武器装备使用中实际可靠性水平的基础上,论述了外界因素和操作人员对武器装备可靠性的影响,提出了在使用维护中武器装备可靠性保障的思路和措施。     

Allocating the U.S. Department of Defense Budget: Revisiting the ‘Incremental/Fair Share Model’

Abstract

This article examines the ‘incremental/fair share model’ that was proposed by Alex Mintz in 1988 concerning the budget allocation of the U.S. Department of Defense. Although Mintz was unable to confirm the correctness of his model, this study demonstrated it to be statistically significant. In the statistical analyses, I used the two-stage least squares method and Durbin’s h-test to better scrutinize the model’s adequacy. Few previous studies have addressed the allocation of the U.S. defence budget; consequently, the incremental/fair-share model should constitute a starting point for further research on the U.S. defence budget allocation.     

“协同制导通道”基本概念及其应用分析

舰艇编队协同反导作战,是海上网络中心作战的典型样式.针对舰艇编队网络化协同反导作战装备体系特殊性,提出了“协同制导通道”基本概念和数学表示方法,并对基于协同制导通道分配方法运用于网络化反导作战条件下武器资源分配进行了研究.分析了单舰反导作战“武器目标分配”的局限性,网络化反导作战“弹-目匹配”新需求和“协同制导通道”的选择方法,为确定“协同制导通道”选择的最优化指标,提出选择“协同制导通道”优化算法奠定了基础.     

车载多接入边缘网络中联合资源分配和动态任务卸载方案

针对车联网中车辆移动速度过快产生的任务卸载失败问题,设计了一个有效的任务卸载风险评估模型,并提出了联合资源分配的动态任务卸载方案。将时间、能耗和风险共同建模为系统效用,通过联合优化卸载决策、资源分配来最大化系统效用。优化问题被公式化为混合整数非线性规划,在给定卸载决策的情况下,利用凸优化技术解决计算资源分配问题,功率分配通过分式规划技术来优化。仿真分析了车辆移动性对系统效用的影响,证明了所提方案的合理性。     

早期可靠性数据的统计分析及其应用

在大型复杂产品研制过程中,通过原理样机的各类试验所获得的早期可靠性数据对产品早期可靠性的评估及可靠性设计具有重要意义。文中利用顺序约束模型研究了早期可靠性数据的处理方法,并将早期可靠性数据评估结果应用于可靠性增长计划的制定,从而有效减短了可靠性增长试验的时间。最后,给出了一个实际例子,以说明上述方法的应用。     

网络中心战条件下舰艇编队武器系统可靠度分析

利用可靠度模型对网络化条件下舰艇编队跨平台组织武器通道的可靠度进行了分析。分析表明,在网络中心战条件下舰艇编队武器系统的可靠度有了大幅度的提升。     

基于Bayes小子样二项分布单元可靠性评定的仿真方法

对于小子样二项分布单元可靠度下限评定,经典方法有很大局限性,文中介绍了Bayes方法。并在其基础上提出基于Bayes方法的Monte Carlo仿真方法,示例证明,该方法有很好的应用前途。     

一种基于任务-系统结构的软件可靠性建模方法

针对军用软件特点,提出并定义一种基于任务剖面的软件系统结构准则;基于该准则,给出一种从功能可靠性、事件可靠性到任务可靠性的分层可靠性预计方法。与侧重于数学建模的相关工作不同,该方法更注重在建模中融合软件可靠性设计、测试和管理,成为可靠性保证的一种途径。     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007