BP神经网络和D-S证据理论的目标识别

目标识别是指挥自动化系统的一个重要组成部分,针对现代战争对抗手段不断增强的特点,运用BP神经网络和D-S证据理论探索作战飞机机型的识别方法.前端采用3层BP神经网络结构,以传感器接收数据为输入,以神经网络输出作为证据,后端对不同传感器的证据按D-S理论进行融合,得到待识别目标的识别概率.经由MATLAB编程对国内外几种主要机型的识别进行仿真研究,与现行目标识别方法相比较,能够更快速、准确、可靠地识别飞机目标,较好地满足了空战中作战指挥系统对飞机机型识别的需求.     

地空导弹对突防飞机的威胁评估模型

从研究航空兵对地空导弹突防作战背景出发,建立了地空导弹对突防飞机的威胁评估指标体系,并运用灰色系统理论,结合非线性树形分布权值分配法的应用,构建了基于多层次灰色理论的地空导弹对突防飞机的威胁评估模型,最后通过实例,对模型的有效性进行了检验.     

遗传算法在装备调拨辅助决策中的应用

利用遗传算法求解装备调拨中的路径优化问题和运输装载问题,并利用MATLAB进行了实例仿真,对装备调拨的辅助决策具有积极的意义。     

Argentina and the Bomb

Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda, by John Mueller. Oxford University Press, 2009. 336 pages, $27.95.

Les armes nucléaires: Mythes et réalités [Nuclear Weapons: Myths and Realities], by Georges Le Guelte. Actes Sud, 2009. 390 pages, [euro]25.     

Imperial nostalgia,the liberal lie,and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency

Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the ‘war on terror’ has even been branded a ‘global counterinsurgency’. However the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrine's application by many national militaries currently ‘rediscovering’ this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.     

A transformed insurgency: The strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the light of communist insurgency theories and a modified Beaufrean exterior/interior framework

This paper examines the insurgency in Nepal (1996–2008) from a military theoretical point of view. It looks at the insurgency from André Beaufre's exterior/interior framework, which is modified to match postmodern conflicts. Simultaneously the importance of the political is underlined. The author critically examines the relevance of the Maoist label the movement and insurgency have received. He claims that the insurgency became a hybrid consisting of Chinese, Latin American, and Leninist thoughts wrapped in pragmatic/revisionists and nationalist ideas. The author also suggests that the ability of insurgents – or counter-insurgents – to combine the effects of the exterior and interior is more likely to constitute the key centre of gravity of a conflict than any single political, economic, or military factor.     

STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND ATTACK FOR SERIES AND PARALLEL RELIABILITY SYSTEMS: COMMENT

The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.     

How Different Terrorist Attacks Affect Stock Markets

Terrorist attacks adversely affect the Pakistani stock market. However, such effect is short-lived: the market recovers from terrorist shocks in one day. The impact of attack depends on the locations and types of attack. The more severe the attack (i.e. more people killed), the more negative is the KSE-100 index return. Most interestingly, stock market contains information about future attacks. In sum, different tactics of terrorists have varied effects on financial markets, which in turn can predict terrorist attacks.     

Emotions,Risk Perceptions and Precautionary Actions of Citizens During a Military Operation Using a New Defence Technology: The Israeli Case of the Iron Dome

Abstract

The current field study used unique data collected in Israel in July 2014, during a military operation that the Israel Defence Forces (I.D.F.) conducted in the Gaza Strip, in reaction to the thousands of missiles launched from there into Israel. During this operation, the new Iron Dome anti-missile defence system was used to protect Israelis exposed to missile attacks. The study examined factors that correlate with decisions to comply with I.D.F. defence instructions regarding behaviour during missile attacks. In addition, the study examined the relationship between attitudes towards the Iron Dome technology and emotions, risk perceptions, and the decision to comply with I.D.F. defence instructions. The results indicate that stronger positive opinions towards Iron Dome were correlated with lower levels of fear and anger, and beliefs that participant’s chances of being injured by a missile were lower than they had been during previous military operation. In addition, better compliance with I.D.F. defence instructions correlated with being more fearful, angrier at Hamas, living closer to Gaza Strip, and having more positive opinions about Iron Dome. The findings also indicate gender differences with respect to factors correlated with risk perceptions, opinions regarding Iron Dome, and precautionary actions during attacks.     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.